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BOOK REVIEW ESSAYS
Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking:
Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the
Dock
REVIEW OF Lawyers in the Dock: Learning from Attorney Disciplinary
Proceedings, by Richard Abel
LESLIE C. LEVIN*
There has been no shortage of efforts to improve the ethical conduct of U.S.
lawyers. Ethics rules are continuously revised to better guide lawyers'
conduct. Bar applicants are required to pass the Multistate Professional
Responsibility Examination in virtually every jurisdiction.' State con-
tinuing legal education requirements invariably include an ethics compo-
nent. 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Sarbanes-Oxley and other legis-
lation have been enacted to make lawyers more accountable for their conduct.
Insurers have become more involved in risk management to help lawyers
avoid ethical problems.3 Large law firms have hired full-time ethics counsel
to help them resolve ethical questions.4 Conflicts checking and calendar
management software are used even in the smallest firms to help avoid ethical
lapses.5 And the list goes on.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I am grateful to Jeremy Blumenthal for
introducing me to the psychological literature on situationism and for his comments on a draft of this article. I
would also like to thank Richard Abel, Milton Regan, and James Stark for their thoughtful comments on an
earlier draft of this article.
1. National Conference of Bar Examiners: MPRE, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/ (last visited
May 28, 2009).
2. Am. Bar Ass'n, Center for Continuing Legal Education, Summary of MCLE Jurisdiction Requirements,
http://www.abanet.org/cle/mcleview.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
3. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A Comparative Analysis
of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 305, 326-27 (1997/1998).
4. Elizabeth Chambliss, The Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1515
(2006).
5. AM. BAR Ass'N LEGAL TECHNOLOGY REsoURcE CENTER, 2008 LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT: LAW
OFFICE TECHNOLOGY (Vol. II), at 41 (2008).
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Intuitively, it would seem that some of these efforts must be having some
positive effects. As an empirical question, however, it is unclear whether any of
these efforts significantly improve lawyers' conduct. In 2007, almost 120,000
discipline complaints were made against the more than 1.4 million lawyers with
active licenses in the U.S.6 Since complaints are made for both legitimate and
illegitimate reasons-and much lawyer misconduct is underreported or unde-
tected-this number provides little meaningful information about how much
lawyer misconduct actually occurs.7 Likewise, because disciplinary agencies will
not pursue complaints about certain types of misconduct,8 and discipline often is
private or not imposed at all,9 discipline statistics convey only limited informa-
tion about the nature and extent of lawyer misconduct.
In his new book, Lawyers in the Dock: Learning from Attorney Disciplinary
Proceedings, Richard Abel looks at lawyer deviance from a different perspec-
tive.1° He directly examines the records of New York disciplinary proceedings,
which "offer an underutilized window on lawyer misconduct."1 He uses six case
studies (involving seven lawyers) to explore the social, psychological and
structural conditions of lawyer deviance. By carefully examining these discipline
matters, Abel reveals the circumstances and -motivations that led these lawyers
into trouble and the manner in which they conducted themselves once they were
caught. He draws heavily on thousands of pages of transcripts, written
submissions, and disciplinary opinions, as well as interviews with some of the
disciplined lawyers.
Reading the record in some of the cases is like viewing an impending train
wreck-obvious to the observer, horrible to watch, but too mesmerizing to avert
the eyes. The cases he describes admittedly are not representative of the typical
case on the disciplinary docket: Abel deliberately chose "extreme cases" which
6. ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, 2007 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, Chart 1
(2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold (last visited May 28, 2009) [hereinafter SOLD].
This figure underreports the number of complaints actually received, as the chart reflects that many complaints
to state discipline agencies were ultimately handled by consumer assistance programs and were excluded from
the number of reported complaints.
7. Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Discipline Sanctions, 48 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 7-8 n.29 (1998). It is also not possible to discern this information
from malpractice claims. Data collected by the National Malpractice Data Center indicate that legal malpractice
claims are on the rise. Martha Neil, As Real Estate Market Sank, Legal Malpractice Claims Rose, A.B.A. J.,
Sept 30, 2008, available at http'/abajoumal.con/news/as realestate_marketsank_legaLmalpraciceclaimsjrose
(last visited May 28, 2009). The data only reflect the claims reported by insurers and do not reflect the claims
against uninsured lawyers. Susan Saab Fortney & Vincent R. Johnson, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS
AND PREVENTION 11 (2008). The data also do not indicate the number of claims that were actually meritorious.
8. Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEo. J. LEGAL Evrscs 1, 18 (2007).
9. Levin, supra note 7, at 8.
10. RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM Ar'ORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008).
11. Id. at 53. The cases were all decided in the First Department, which includes Manhattan and the Bronx.
Id. at 56.
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were more dramatic.1 2 Such cases are arguably "more revealing of motivation, ' 1 3
but this choice limits the ability to generalize from the case studies. Abel
recognizes that many more case studies would be needed "before drawing even a
tentative map" of the terrain of lawyer misconduct.14 Nevertheless, as he notes, in
several respects the lawyers he studies are very much like the average attorney
upon whom discipline is imposed.
The similarities between the lawyers Abel studies and the average disciplined
lawyer are that Abel's attorneys are male, white and mostly middle-aged. The
lawyers he studies, like most disciplined lawyers, predominantly practice in solo
and small firms and represent individuals or small businesses rather than large
organizations. 15 Lawyers who are disciplined often report serious stress in their
lives due to personal or financial problems 16 and in half of Abel's cases, the
attorneys suffered from serious physical illness, family problems, or significant
financial concerns. Some of the lawyers Abel describes, like other disciplined
lawyers, had previously been subject to disciplinary sanctions. 17
There are, however, some differences between Abel's cases and the typical
discipline matter. Unlike most discipline cases, the cases Abel describes are not
simply instances of neglect of client matters or failure to communicate, which are
the most common reasons for complaints. 18 Although three of the case studies
involve neglect of client matters, the lawyers also engaged in other serious
malfeasance. Unlike most discipline cases where sanctions are imposed, which
typically result in private admonitions or public reprimands,' 9 the lawyers Abel
describes received more serious sanctions. Unlike the typical discipline case,
most of the disciplinary matters that Abel studies were prolonged, in large part
because the lawyers would not--or could not-acknowledge wrongdoing.
Abel provides a rich and textured account of the lives of these lawyers, how
they got into trouble, and how they dealt with their situations once others learned
what the lawyers had done. Three of the lawyers neglected client matters. David
Kreitzer had a volume personal injury practice in which he not only neglected
cases, but also engaged in a fraudulent "ten percenter" scheme in which he paid
kickbacks to insurance adjusters in order to expedite payment of claims. 20 Joseph
Muto neglected immigration cases which had been prepared by "travel agencies"
12. Id. at 57.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 55.
15. Id. at 54-56.
16. See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 9.32 COmMENTARY (1991).
17. Recidivism among lawyers who receive discipline sanctions is not uncommon, but the actual rate of
recidivism is not known. Levin, supra note 8, at 2-3. Among the lawyers Abel studies, one had received four
prior admonitions, one had six prior admonitions, and one had received an admonition and had previously been
suspended from practice. ABEL, supra note 10, at 91, 161-62, 264-65.
18. ABEL, supra note 10, at 57.
19. See SOLD, supra note 6, at Chart H.
20. Abel, supra note 10, at 71 passim.
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that were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.21 Lawrence Furtzaig
neglected some cases and then lied to clients and fabricated documents to cover
up his neglect. 22 Two other matters Abel studies involved fee-related misconduct.
In one of those cases, Phillip Byler overreached for his fee in a tax matter and
then refused to escrow the contested amount when a dispute arose.23 The final
matter involved overzealous advocacy by Arthur Wiseheart in his handling of
privileged documents taken by his client from opposing counsel's conference
table in a contentious sexual harassment case.24
By studying individual lawyers engaged in a range of misconduct, Abel has
taken on a formidable task. What lessons, if any, can fairly be drawn from these
extreme cases? Abel looks to sociological studies of deviance in other contexts to
make sense of the lawyer misconduct he chronicles in his case studies. He finds
that like other deviants, "no distinctive biologies or biographies destined them for
punishment. '25 The closest analogy he finds is in studies of white collar
criminals, who often betray one-shot customers and clients. He further notes that
some lawyers deliberately violate ethical rules in the pursuit of profit, but "most
drift into such conduct unselfconsciously" and "are genuinely surprised (and
outraged) when they are caught., 26 Like white collar criminals, these disciplined
lawyers often contest culpability, blame their victims, and insist no one was
harmed.27
Abel also recognizes that deviance has powerful psychological motivations.28
In most of his cases, the lawyers do not see the problems with their misconduct at
the time that they are engaging in it and are unable to acknowledge that what they
did was ethically problematic even once they find themselves in discipline
proceedings. Instead, they engage in "profound self-deception. 29 It is tempting
to ascribe their behavior to personality disorders that make Abel's lawyers
different from the average attorney. And indeed, some of the research concerning
lawyers' personality traits suggests that personality characteristics may account
for some of the extreme behaviors that Abel describes. 30 But it appears that many
21. Id. at 105 passim.
22. Id. at 193 passim.
23. Id. at 289 passim.
24. Id. at 389 passim. For ease of reference, a summary of these cases appears in the Appendix. Due to its
factual complexity, the details of the sixth case study will not be discussed in this essay.
25. ABEL, supra note 10, at 52.
26. Id. at 52-53.
27. Id. at 53.
28. Id. at512.
29. Id. at 494. In fact, it may be more accurate to say that they do see the problems with their conduct, but that
they avoid acknowledging those problems-even to themselves.
30. As a group, lawyers tend to be more aggressive, competitive and achievement-oriented than the average
individual. See SuSAN SwAtm DAIcoFF, Lawyer, KNow THYSELF: A PsYcHoLOGIcAL ANALYSIS OF PERSONALrrY
STRENGTHS AND WEAK.NIESSES 26-28 (2004). They may also have less resilience or ego strength than the general
population, making them more defensive and hypersensitive to criticism. Larry R. Richard, Herding Cats: The
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of the behaviors of his lawyers can be explained by social and psychological
processes that affect the decisionmaking and conduct of most human beings.
Abel's case studies present an extraordinarily valuable opportunity to explore a
host of important questions. He frames his inquiry broadly in terms of how and
why lawyers betray trust.3 His case studies also permit consideration of more
specific questions (some of which he directly addresses). For example, where and
why does lawyer misconduct begin? How do lawyers decide how to proceed
when a novel ethical problem presents itself in practice? What do these case
studies suggest about the value of consulting with other colleagues? Why do
these lawyers persist in ethically problematic conduct even in the face of clear
evidence that they should not? And perhaps hardest of all-what steps, if any, can
be taken to prevent, or at least reduce, the types of lawyer misconduct that Abel
so vividly describes?
The case studies also permit consideration of the impact of various psychologi-
cal processes on lawyers' ethical decisionmaking and behavior. Psychologists
have found that moral behavior is at times disconnected from moral reason-
ing.32 Situationists argue that when we account for the behavior of individuals,
we underestimate the impact of situational or environmental factors and over-
estimate the importance of "dispositional" factors.33 In addition, cognitive
psychologists have shown how psychological biases can unconsciously shape
ethical decisionmaking. 34 Indeed, much of what I am calling "ethical decision-
making" is non-conscious. 35 Social intuitionists argue that people make many
Lawyer Personality Revealed, http://www.practicepro.ca/LawPROmag/RichardHerdingCats.pdf (last visited
May 28, 2009). Abel's descriptions suggest that some of the lawyers he studied may have displayed some of
these characteristics even more than the average lawyer. There is no way to determine from the case studies,
however, whether this is actually correct.
31. ABEL, supra note 10, at 52.
32. See Linda K. Trevifio et al., Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. MGMT. 951,960 (2006).
33. Lee Ross & Donna Shestowksy, Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice,
97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1081, 1093 (2003); Steven M. Samuels & William D. Casebeer, A Social Psychological View
of Morality: Why Knowledge of Situational Influences on Behavior Can Improve Character Development
Practices, 34 J. MoRAL EDuc. 73, 77 (2005). In essence, situationists maintain that humans are moved more by
their situations than by disposition-based choice. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional
Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311,316 (2008).
34. See, e.g., Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement in the Perpetuation of Inhumanities, 3 PERSONALrrY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 191, 194 (1999); Trevifio et al., supra note 32, at 959. Although some psychologists dis-
tinguish between "unconscious" and "non-conscious" processes, I use the terms interchangeably to mean
mental processes or decisions of which the individual is not consciously aware.
35. See, e.g., LINDA KLEBE TREvINo & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHIcs IN BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS
160-61 (2003); Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, 25 Ras.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEiAv. 1, 11-12 (2003); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REv. 814, 822 (2001); Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of
Interest and the Case ofAuditor Independence: Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 AcAD. MGMT.
REv. 1, 2, 7 (2006). Throughout this essay, I use the term "ethical decisionmaking" broadly to include both
conscious moral deliberation and non-conscious processes that result in behavior that comports with-or
violates-moral or legal norms.
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ethically relevant decisions automatically; they intuitively form a judgment, and
then search for justifications for their decisions.36 If ethical decisionmaking is
often a non-conscious process, this has important implications for understanding
lawyer misconduct and for attempting to address it.
Rick Abel refers to several psychological concepts in his book to explain the
behavior of the lawyers he studies, although he focuses primarily on the
sociological literature on deviance to frame his inquiry about why lawyers betray
trust.37 He finds that the behavior of these lawyers can be explained, at least in
part, by "greed or need."38 He also notes that the most striking trait shared by
these lawyers "was their conviction that they were above the law.",39 Neverthe-
less, he is cautiously optimistic about the possibility of restoring the public's trust
in lawyers." He considers a number of ways to reduce the opportunities and
incentives for lawyers to betray trust.4 1
Lawyers in the Dock provides some wonderful-and painful-insights into
lawyer deviance. In this essay, I will consider what additional light some of the
psychological literature might shed on Abel's findings. More specifically, I will
consider how social and psychological processes may help to explain the
trajectory of lawyer misconduct and some of the specific behaviors that Abel
describes I do so recognizing that legal academics who seek to draw upon the
psychological research must proceed with care. Some psychologists have
justifiably criticized "secondary users of the psychological research" who would
"oversimplify and generalize" those findings.42 Despite my best efforts, I will
no doubt fall into that category. Nevertheless, the psychological literature
requires our attention if we wish to understand-and effectively address-lawyer
deviance.43
36. Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph, Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally
Variable Virtue Ethics, DAEDALUS, Fall 2004, at 57; Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund, Social Intuitionists
Answer Six Questions About Morality, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 181-217 (W. Sinnott-Armstrong ed. 2007);
see also Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment, 17 PSYCHOL.
SQ. 1082, 1087 (2006).
37. ABEL, supra note 10, at 25-52. Abel refers, for example, to ego, transference, repression, paranoia and
neutralization and cites to some of the psychological literature. Id. at 32-33, 52, 205, 281,480,493. For the most
part, however, he does not devote extended discussion to the psychological research.
38. Id. at 492.
39. Id. at 495.
40. Id. at491.
41. Id. at512-28.
42. Douglas A. Kysar, Group Report: Are Heuristics a Problem or a Solution?, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW
111 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds. 2006).
43. I do not mean to suggest that I am the first to undertake this effort. Legal scholars are increasing!y turning
their attention to the impact of psychological processes on lawyers' ethical decisionmaking. See, e.g., Donald C.
Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Be-
havior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629 (1997); Richard W. Painter, Lawyers'Rules, Auditors'Rules and the Psychology
of Concealment, 84 MiNm. L. REv. 1399 (2000); Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate
Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 451 (2007); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral
Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 941 (2007); Tanina Rostain, Waking Up from
1554 [Vol. 22:1549
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In Lawyers in the Dock, various social and psychological processes propel the
lawyers down the path to deviance. Abel finds that "[h]abit is their tragic flaw, not
inexperience." 44 In Part I of the essay, I will consider how these lawyers came to
form their "habits" and the role the legal community plays in helping them do so.
I will use Abel's insights and attempt to build upon them to identify how and
where some lawyer deviance begins. In Part II, I will look at research concerning
certain psychological biases and other processes that may have affected the
lawyers in the case studies. I will first consider how certain self-serving biases
may contribute to neglect of client matters. I will then look at how psychological
processes may affect the decisionmaking of experienced lawyers when they
confront a novel problem in their practices. I will conclude with a discussion of
the power of commitment to a course of conduct and the role of self-deception,
both of which seemingly cause Abel's lawyers to persist in deviant behavior. In
Part III, I will use the case studies to consider the role that the discipline process
may play in perpetuating self-justifying behaviors. Abel identifies this possibility
in his book and I will draw upon psychological research to develop his insight a
bit further. Finally, in Part IV of the essay, I will consider, in light of the social and
psychological processes at play, some strategies to address lawyer misconduct. I
will discuss some of Abel's suggestions and a few thoughts of my own.
I. LEARNING NORMs FROM THE COMMUNITY
The attorneys described in Lawyers in the Dock demonstrate many of the
patterns of socialization and decisionmaking that scholars have reported when
studying lawyers in a variety of practice contexts. As Abel notes, Jerome Carlin
interviewed New York City lawyers in the 1960's and concluded that office
settings, colleagues, and clients have a significant effect upon their views of
ethical norms.4 5 Carlin found that lawyers who worked in offices with ethically
permissive climates had the highest rate of violations and that the longer a lawyer
was a member of an established office, the more the lawyer's behavior conformed
to the ethical climate of the office.4 6 Lawyers who represented individuals and
small businesses had more opportunities to exploit clients and more temptations
to violate bar norms than other lawyers.47 Since then, studies repeatedly have
shown that office colleagues, other attorneys, and clients affect lawyers' ethical
Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context, Discretionary Judgment, and The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REv.
955 (1999). Given the sometimes profound impact of psychological processes on lawyer decisionmaking and
behavior, however, this topic remains insufficiently incorporated into the thinking by courts, regulators and the
bar about how to prevent lawyer misconduct.
44. ABEL, supra note 10, at 496.
45. JERomE E. CARJN, LAwYERs' ETIcs: A SURVEY OF THE NEw YORK CITY BAR 96 (1966).
46. Id. at 98.
47. Id. at 66-73.
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views (and in some cases, their conduct) in a variety of other practice settings.48
This section will review some of the research describing how lawyers learn bar
norms from the lawyers around them, as well as lessons from social psychology
as to why this occurs. Abel's case studies are then used to consider briefly how the
social world within which the lawyers found themselves seems to have shaped
their understanding of norms-and led some of them into deviant behavior.
A. LAWYER SOCIALIZATION TO PRACTICE NORMS
Lawyers learn from other lawyers. They learn through direct instruction,
conversations they overhear, and from observation of the lawyers around them.4 9
Moreover, the communities of practice within which they operate-i.e., the
groups of lawyers with whom they interact and to whom they compare them-
selves-shape their understanding of practice norms.5 ° In their study of divorce
lawyers, Lynn Mather, Craig McEwen, and Richard Maiman found that the
communities of practice within which these lawyers worked encouraged the
norm of the reasonable lawyer.51 The norm of "reasonableness" also permeated
the local professional community of legal aid lawyers when dealing with judges,
opposing counsel, and clients.52 Cooperativeness, courtesy, and trust were
hallmarks of the country lawyers that Donald Landon studied and the community
of lawyers imposed informal sanctions against those who did not comply with
those norms.5 3 In the large law firm setting, the community may be a single firm
department or practice group, from which younger lawyers learn the norms of
aggressive discovery practice.54
Social psychology helps to explain why this occurs. Ralph Hertwig notes that
"[slocial learning-of which imitation is an example-allows individuals to
learn about their environment without engaging in potentially hazardous learn-
48. See LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE
(2001); Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principles of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REv. 631
(2005); Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 Hous. L. REv. 309
(2004); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985); Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net:
The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837 (1998).
49. CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM
ATrORNEYS (1996); FRANCES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFES-
SION 173-76 (1981); Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Competence,
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469,482-87 (1993); Kirkland, supra note 48, at 691,696, 711; Leslie C. Levin, Guardians at
the Gate: The Backgrounds, Career Paths and Professional Development of Private US Immigration Lawyers,
34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 399,425-29 (2009)..
50. MATHER Er AL., supra note 48, at 6.
51. Id. at 48.
52. JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 56-61 (1982).
53. DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 140-44
(1990).
54. Suchman, supra note 48, at 863.
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ing trials or wasting large amounts of time. '55 Depending upon the cir-
cumstances, the learned behavior may be that exhibited by the majority, by the
most successful individuals, or by the nearest individual. When this behavior
and legal rules diverge, observing and copying behavior will result in rule
violation.56
But imitation is not the only social process at work. The psychological pressure
on individuals to conform to the behavior of a group can be powerful. A group is
more effective at inducing conformity if (1) it consists of experts; (2) the
members are important to the individual; or (3) the members are comparable to
the actor in some way.57 It is not difficult to see how experienced lawyers
transmit their norms and induce compliance with them, especially when a lawyer
is new to practice and relatively inexperienced.
Indeed, lessons learned from the community when the individual is a relative
newcomer may have an especially strong impact. Abel draws on Jason Ditton's
Part-Time Crime: An Ethnography of Fiddling and Pilferage,58 which describes
how the community within which bread salesmen work conveys and inculcates
the acceptability of the norm of "fiddling" (stealing from customers) during early
training.59 As Abel notes, "new salesmen were quickly and inescapably social-
ized into fiddling" by supervisors who "offer frank and open descriptions of the
fiddle.",60 Although they are initially surprised by their willingness to engage in
the fiddle, after doing so for awhile, their position "hardens., 61 Later on, bread
salesmen adopt guilt reduction techniques to account to themselves for their
behavior, including seeing themselves as victims.
62
Not surprisingly, the early experiences of lawyers in practice can also have a
powerful impact on their ethical decisionmaking. Mentors and other colleagues
encountered early in practice convey lessons about practice norms that can
continue to affect lawyers even after the relationship has ended. The ethical
decisions made early in practice may not be re-examined. 63 The long-lasting
impact of these early experiences--or the "hardening" to use Ditton's term-can
be explained, in part, by psychological processes that are further described in Part
II below.
55. Ralph Hertwig, Do Legal Rules Rule Behavior?, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 42, at 398.
56. Id.
57. ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SocLA ANIMAL 25-26 (9th ed. 2003).
58. JASON DrrrON, PART-TIME CRIE, AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF FIDDLING AND PILFERAGE (1977).
59. ABEL, supra note 10, at 46-47.
60. Id. at 46-47 (quoting DrrrON, supra note 58, at 36).
61. DrrrON, supra note 58, at 34.
62. ABEL, supra note 10, at 49-50.
63. Levin, supra note 48, at 364-65.
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B. THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITY ON ABEL'S LAWYERS
The impact of early experiences in practice can be seen in Abel's case studies.
For example, Lawrence Furtzaig began law practice in a real estate firm where he
quickly learned that he had to answer his own questions and solve his own
problems. His direct supervisor was not "easy to ask for either input or additional
help" and "[t]here was no one else to ask for help. ' 4 His firm was a place where
"[w]ords were few and far between. Consequences were large."65 It was also a
"pressurized place" where Furtzaig billed between 2,200 and 2,400 hours per
year. When Furtzaig encountered a difficult problem with ethical implications,
six years after bar admission and while he was a non-equity partner, he did not
seek advice from more seasoned lawyers. Furtzaig's client, a landlord, was
involved in a rent strike in which the tenants' claims were meritorious, but one
tenant was demanding a remodeled kitchen before agreeing to pay rent arrears.
The landlord resisted the request because of fear that the remodeling would
reveal lead paint contamination in the apartment.66 Furtzaig began to avoid
working on the matter.67 He failed to restore two of the cases to the trial calendar
after tenants failed to pay rent arrears, notwithstanding their agreement to do so.
Furtzaig may have been concerned that if he restored the cases to the calendar, he
could not assert at trial that the apartments were in good condition without
committing fraud. He did not discuss this ethical question or his neglect with his
client or his colleagues. He believed his supervisor "would just say deal with
it. ' ' 68 Consequently, he later admitted, "I lied and I paid the money [to the client]
myself," a total of $60,000.69 The pattern of not asking for help, neglecting cases,
and then lying to clients or courts to cover up his neglect was repeated in ten to
fifteen other matters over a ten-year period before he was caught and suspended
from practice.7"
Joseph Muto learned from the people with whom he first worked when he
moved to New York City that high volume practices and work with non-lawyer
"travel agents" was an accepted norm (among some lawyers) in the immigration
field.71 Travel agencies in Chinatown often file immigration papers and perform
other legal services for undocumented immigrants and then hire lawyers-who
72had had no previous contact with their immigrant "clients"-to appear in court.Muto's first employer in the immigration field worked with travel agencies, and
64. ABEL, supra note 10, at 194.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 195.
67. Id. at 201.
68. Id. at 195.
69. Id.
70. In re Furtzaig, 762 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1st Dept. 2003).
71. Muto had unsuccessfully practiced other types of law in upstate New York before moving to New York
City. ABEL, supra note 10, at 160-61.
72. Id. at 105-06, 109-10, 113, 178-79.
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when he left that firm, he continued to work with travel agencies, as he had
learned to do from office colleagues.73 This behavior is consistent with the
research showing that the attitudes and behaviors of peers in the work place affect
an individual's ethical behavior and that the frequency and intensity of
interactions with peers can make their influence stronger.74
David Kreitzer's story reveals another instance in which a disciplined lawyer
learned practice norms from other lawyers that did not conform with substantive
law or ethical rules. Kreitzer learned from another lawyer with whom he had
dealings about the ten percenter scheme, in which personal injury lawyers paid
middlemen and insurance adjusters a kick back to expedite settlement of
claims.75 As he explained, "In hindsight, my head was in the ground. It was an
improper thing to do. But at the time other attorneys [were] doing it. I did not
believe... that there was anything wrong--other than maybe some ethical
violations."76 In essence, Kreitzer permitted the norms of the lawyers around him
to shape--or at least help justify-his view of permissible conduct.
These three accounts suggest how and when some lawyer deviance begins.
They do not, however, explain why some lawyers engage in deviant behavior and
why others do not. For instance, in Muto's case, Abel describes another
immigration lawyer, Jan Allen Reiner, who testified for disciplinary counsel at
Muto's hearing, about conducting a different sort of practice near Chinatown that
did not rely on travel agencies or a high volume business.77 This may be because
Reiner started out in a different type of immigration practice than Muto and
learned different practice norms or because his involvement in an immigrationbar association affected his views of acceptable practices.7 It is also possible that
personality differences account for some differences in behavior. For example,
conscientiousness is one of the "big five" dimensions of personality, 79 and
Muto's neglect of client matters may be due, in part, to his personality. Abel's
case studies suggest, however, that experiences in practice with other attorneys
can also influence the conduct of some lawyers long after they first occur.
73. Id. at 120-21, 163, 179-80.
74. Treviflo et al., supra note 32, at 966.
75. ABEL, supra note 10, at 92-93. Twenty-one lawyers, including Kreitzer, were ultimately charged with this
conduct, which allegedly involved $ 19 million in insurance payments.
76. Id. at 93. Kreitzer's comment suggests that he views "ethical violations" as rule violations. This is a
common usage of the term "ethical" by lawyers. See Levin, supra note 48, at 311 n.5.
77. ABEL, supra note 10, at 108-09, 177-78.
78. Abel notes that Reiner belongs to an immigration bar association. Id. at 178. That bar association, which
is known as the American Immigration Lawyers' Association ("AILA"), serves an educative and socializing
function for its members. See Levin, supra note 49, at 430. Reiner started out in immigration practice with his
father, who was a former president of AILA, and he attributes the care that he demonstrates in practice to his
detail-oriented father and to his administrative law professor, who taught him the importance of creating the
strongest possible record at trial. Telephone Interview with Jan Allen Reiner, solo practitioner, in New York, NY
(Feb. 9, 2009).
79. John M. Digman, Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
417,418-22 (1990).
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II. PSYCHOLOGICAL BIASES, NOVEL QUESTIONS,
AND THE POWER OF COMMITMENT
Thus far, the discussion of ethical decisionmaking has focused in broad strokes
on the legal community's impact on the conduct of lawyers. Psychologists are
also interested in internal decisionmaking processes. They have' attempted to
break down the decisionmaking process into component parts in order to better
understand it. Psychologists often rely on a four-part framework which consists
of moral awareness, moral judgment, moral motivation (to act), and moral
behavior.8° They disagree about the content and timing of the first two parts-and
their relationship to the third-and there is increasing uncertainty about whether
the process is well-ordered.8 ' Indeed, some psychologists argue that moral
reasoning is used to justify behavior after it occurs.8 2
The research also suggests that various psychological processes that help to
maintain self-esteem play an important role in lawyers' ethical decisionmaking
and their professional misconduct. Indeed, much of the conduct Abel uncovers in
his research can be explained by these processes. After describing some of these
psychological processes, I will use Abel's case studies to consider how they may
lead to the neglect of client matters which, as previously mentioned, is the most
common reason for discipline complaints.8 3 The case studies also provide an
opportunity to consider how these psychological biases may operate when
experienced lawyers confront a novel question in practice. I will then draw on
some of the psychological research to identify the processes that cause these
decisions to "harden" once commitment to a course of action occurs.
A. PSYCHOLOGICAL BIASES AND LAWYER MISCONDUCT
Many cognitive and social psychologists now believe that human reasoning is
routinely reliant on heuristics and biases.8 4 A heuristic is a strategy that people
use when making decisions with limited time and information.85 It is a sim-
plifying strategy or rule of thumb used to help them cope with a complex
environment8 6 In certain situations, heuristics lead to systematic biases that
deviate from the "correct" answer.87 The terms "heuristic" and "bias" are often
80. JAMES R. REST, MORAL DEVELOPMENT: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY (1986); JAMES REST ET AL.,
POSTCONVENT1ONAL MORAL THINKING: A NEO-KoHLBERGIAN APPROACH (1999).
81. See supra note 35.
82: See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Regan, supra note 43, at 953.
83. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
84. Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction-Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now, in HEURISTICS
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTumvE JuDGMENTr 1, 6-7 (Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
85. Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer, Law and Heuristics: An Interdisciplinary Venture, in HEURISTICS
AND THE LAW, supra note 42, at 1-2.
86. See MAX H. BAZERMAN & DONA. MOORE, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 6 (8th ed. 2009).
87. SCOTr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF Jun MENT AND DECISION MAKING 109 (1993).
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used interchangeably although the former describes a process of thinking and the
latter is an outcome that reflects a systematic error in judgment.88
Many psychologists also believe that the relatively effortless, reflexive, and
intuitive mental processes that are embodied in heuristics and biases are one part
of "dual process" or "two systems" models of cognition. Tile first system is in-
tuitive, quick, and associative. The second system involves intentional mental
processes that are more deliberate and taxing.89 Intuition can be overridden by
the second mode of thinking in the performance of unfamiliar tasks, the
processing of abstract concepts, and the deliberate application of rules.9" For
example, a lawyer who is aware that she is confronting an- ethical question might
engage in the more deliberative second mode of thinking to resolve it. Complex
cognitive operations that are part of system two reasoning migrate to system one
reasoning as proficiency and skill are acquired. 91
How does this relate to ethical decisionmaking and behavior? Psychologists
now believe that conscious deliberation plays a relatively minor role in shaping
behavior 92 and that much of what we might call ethical decisionmaking is
non-conscious.93 Even if the individual is intentionally making a decision, he is
often not cognizant that an ethical issue is presented.94 There are a variety of
reasons why this may occur, especially in the work place. Certain decisions may
not be viewed in "ethical" terms when they are made, but rather as a business
decision.95 Incrementalism-i.e., the tendency to take small steps that eventually
cross ethical lines-may cause individuals to cross those lines without con-
sciously realizing it.96 Routinization of a practice removes discrete "decision
points that might trigger reflective thought[s]. '  Once a decision has been
made-regardless of whether it was conscious or non-conscious-people may
use moral schemas or "scripts" to help them organize their thinking and deter-
mine how to address a similar issue in the future, without any further conscious
88. Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristics, in HEURS'rICS AND THE LAW, supra note 42, at 18.
89. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive
Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUrrIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 84, at 51; Russell
Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics for Law, in HEUISnCS AND THE LAW, supra note 42, at 56-57, 109-10.
90. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 89, at 50.
91. Id. at 51.
92. See Regan, supra note 43, at 943 (citing John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable
Automaticity of Being, 54 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 462 (1999)).
93. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
94. See Regan, supra note 43, at 949, 953; Trevifio et al., supra note 32, at 961-62.
95. See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical
Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. Ras. 223 (2004). This is consistent with my own findings when I interviewed solo and
small firm lawyers that they often did not think of the ethical issues they encountered in those terms. Levin,
supra note 48, at 335-36.
96. See George Loewenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed Trade-offs Between
Self and Other, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BussNEss ETHICS 214, 220 (David M.
Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
97. Ashforth & Anand, supra note 35, at 11.
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decisionmaking about how to proceed. 98 These schemas or scripts may be
activated in work *settings and "depress the triggering of moral reasoning
processes. ' 9 9
To complicate matters, even when people are consciously engaged in
decisionmaking, they are not objective information processors.t°° The ego has
been compared to a totalitarian state "in which unflattering or undesirable facts
are suppressed in the interest of self-enhancement" and people write their "own
history by altering [their] memories to make them consistent with these self-
flattering beliefs."' 1 This occurs because people need to see themselves as good
and reasonable, and subconsciously distort evidence to bolster or maintain a
positive self-image. 10 2 The maintenance and enhancement of self-esteem has
been described as "a fundamental human impulse.' 1 3 Enhanced self-esteem has
positive functions, which include increasing the individual's motivation to
"undertake projects and persevere in ... his goals."'" The desire to enhance
self-esteem helps explain the evidence "that people tend to recall their successes
more than their failures and have self-serving.., recollections.., of their past
performances."'10 5 Indeed, it helps to explain a host of biases that skew
perceptions when people look at themselves and the outside world.
Overoptimism and overconfidence are two such self-serving biases.10 6 For
example, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that people are unrealistically
98. Jerome L. Singer & Peter Salovey, Organized Knowledge and Personality: Person Schemas, Self
Schemas, Prototypes, and Scripts, in PERSON SCHEMAS AND MALADAPTIVE INTERPERSONAL PAITERNS 35 (Mardi
J. Horowitz ed., 1991); see also TREvIEo & WEAVER, supra note 35, at 160-61. A schema is a general knowledge
structure that permits an individual to "[ildentify stimuli quickly, cluster them into manageable units, fill in
information and select a strategy in order to solve a problem or reach a goal." Singer & Salovey, supra at 35. A
script is a type of schema that can involve a sequence of events in well-known situations. Id. at 40; Richard
Nisbett & Lee Ross, HuMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 34 (1980).
99. Trevifio et al., supra note 32, at 956.
100. Loewenstein, supra note 96, at 221.
101. BAZERmAN & MOORE, supra note 86, at 90 (citing A. G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication
and Revision of Personal History, 35 AM. PSYCH OL. 603 (1980)).
102. See Mark R. Leary & Deborah L. Downs, Interpersonal Functions of the Self-Esteem Motive: The
Self-Esteem System as a Sociometer, in EFFICACY, AGENCY, AND SELF EsTEEM 123-25 (Michael H. Kernis
ed.1995); Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CH.-KENT L. REv. 1569,
1575 (2000); Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation, 117 Q. J. EcoN. 871,
872 (2002).
103. Benabou & Tirole, supra note 102, at 871; see also C. R. Snyder, Collaborative Companions: The
Relationship of Self-Deception and Excuse Making, in SELF-DECEPTION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING: NEw
ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY 36 (Michael W. Martin ed. 1985).
104. See BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 86, at 90, 93; Benabou & Tirole, supra note 102, at 977.
105. Benabou & Tirole, supra note 102, at 874, 885.
106. PLous, supra note 87, at 219; Donald C. Langevoort, Heuristics Inside the Firm: Perspectives from
Behavioral Law and Economics, in HEuRIsrIcs AND THE LAW, supra note 42, at 92; Jeffrey R. Rachlinski, The
Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (2003). Examples of over-
optimism abound and can be seen, most recently, in the irrational exuberance surrounding the real estate market
and in the dot-com "bubble" of the 1990's.
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optimistic about their own futures.10 7 As Max Bazerman notes, "we persist in be-
lieving that we can accomplish more in a day than is humanly possible, and we
seem immune to the continual feedback that the world provides on our
limitations."' 10 Overoptimism causes people to believe that they can control
uncontrollable events and to overestimate the extent to which their actions can
guarantee a certain outcome.I19
People are also more confident in their judgments than is warranted by
objective facts. n ° Overconfidence has been found in a variety of experts,
including lawyers, and especially where the issues were personally relevant."1 '
The more difficult the prediction, the more likely people are to feel overconfident
about their predictions.11 2 Overconfidence may cause people to think they are
making good choices and do not need to reconsider how to approach a decision
they have previously made. 113 This is significant because confidence is thought to
control action. 
114
Overconfidence and overoptimism may also account for what has been
described as the planning fallacy, which is the tendency for people to be over-
optimistic about when a project will be completed. The planning fallacy occurs
because people. rely on their best-case plans for a project. and disregard past
experience.1 5 For example, students will confidently believe that they will
complete a current assignment well before the due date even when their past
practice has been to finish assignments later than they expected.' 16 When people
plan, they look at the specific tasks that must be completed and possible factors in
the future that may interfere with the plan, but they do not consider all the
107. MAx H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 66 (5th ed. 2002) (citing S.E. TAYLOR,
POsITvE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND THE HEALTHY MIND (1989)); see also Neil D. Weinstein,
Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALrY & SOC. PSYC-OL. 806, 807-08, 814 (1980).
108. BAZERMAN, supra note 107, at 66.
109. Id. at 67; Benabou & Tirole, supra note 102, at 874.
110. PLous, supra note 87, at 217-20; Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the
Determinants of Confidence, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra
note 84, at 230.
111. Willem A. Wagenaar & Gideon B. Keren, Does the Expert Know? The Reliability of Predictions and
Confidence Ratings of Experts, in INTELLIGENT DECISION SUPPORT IN PROCESS ENvlONMENers 87, 100-01 (Erik
Holinagel et al. eds. 1986); see Derek J.. Koehler et al., The Calibration of Expert Judgment: Heuristics and
Biases Beyond the Laboratory, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra
note 84, at 706.
112. See Griffin & Tversky, supra note 110, at 243; PLouS, supra note 87, at 219. But see Peter Juslin et al.,
NaiVe Empiricism and Dogmatism in Confidence Research: A Critical Examination of the Hard-Easy Effect,
107 PSYCHOL. REV. 384, 388, 393 (2000) (challenging the findings that people display greater overoptimism
when confronted with hard tasks).
113. Rachlinski, supra note 106, at 1220.
114. See Griffin & Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNMrVE
PSYCHOL. 411,432 (1992).
115. See Roger Buehler, et al., Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes and Consequences of Optimistic
Time Predictions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUrIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 84, at 250.
116. Id. at 252.
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scenarios that may unfold or their own past history performing similar tasks." 7
Not surprisingly, optimism is higher when the deadline for completion is more
distant in time. "1
8
These cognitive biases may have affected the judgment of Furtzaig, Muto, and
possibly Kreitzer, who all neglected client matters. For example, Muto had a high
volume immigration practice, which he claimed included more than 500 pending
matters." 9 He did not turn away cases.' 2° It would be obvious to an objective
observer that Muto could not possibly handle that many matters competently on
his own, and not surprisingly, he missed court appearances and filing dead-
lines. 12' Nor could he have reasonably expected to retain all of his filing dates and
court appearances in his head, 122 but overoptimism and overconfidence in his
own abilities may have caused him to believe otherwise. Likewise, his willing-
ness to take on cases in New Orleans, Houston and San Francisco-
notwithstanding his deep-seated flying phobia that repeatedly prevented him
from boarding planes 123-may also be explained, at least in part, by these
self-serving biases.
I do not mean to suggest that the neglect described in Lawyers in the Dock was
solely due to overoptimism and overconfidence. Muto was relatively new to
immigration practice and lacked the training and administrative skills to manage
a volume practice on his own.' 24 Moreover, as Abel observes, these lawyers were
motivated by "greed or need."' 125 Muto's desire to make money no doubt led him
to take more cases than he could handle. In Furtzaig's case, his desire to succeed
at his law firm-and to support his wife and triplets-caused him to uncomplain-
ingly accept cases that he did not have the time to handle. Abel's case studies do
not suggest, however, that Muto and Furtzaig were primarily motivated to
neglect the cases due to indifference or avarice. Furtzaig was "recognized by
colleagues, clients, firm employees and adversaries for his honesty, incisive
intelligence, excellent lawyer skills and hard work."' 126 Abel's account suggests
that Muto genuinely wanted to help his immigrant clients.' 27 It appears that in
117. Id. at 253-54.
118. Id. at 264.
119. ABEL, supra note 10, at 106.
120. Id. at 166, 177.
121. Id. at 116-17.
122. According to Abel, "[Muto] did not know what an office diary was." Id. at 172.
123. Id. at 137-140, 173, 177. Muto's therapist testified at the disciplinary hearing that she had seen him 75
times for his flying phobia, often "at the airport, where you've fully believed you could get on an airplane." Id. at
140.
124. Muto first worked for another immigration lawyer for about six months before he left to set up his own
practice. Id. at 105.
125. Id at 492.
126. Id. at 199.
127. Id. at 143, 166, 176. Kreitzer may present a different case. Kreitzer had over one thousand active cases,
worked seven days a week, and was treated for esophageal cancer during part of the relevant time period. ABEL,
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their cases and in other cases of lawyer neglect, the inability to step back and
view the situation less optimistically and more objectively may be explained, at
least in part, by these psychological biases.
B. LAWYER RESPONSES TO NOVEL PROBLEMS
Abel's case studies provide a rare opportunity to trace the decisionmaking of
experienced lawyers who encounter novel ethical problems in practice. By
"novel," I mean problems the lawyers themselves have not previously faced.
Novel problems are not the source of most discipline complaints, but the ways in
which these problems are approached and resolved are important because the
resolution of a novel problem may provide a schema or script for how a lawyer
handles similar situations in the future. 128 Every lawyer confronts novel ethical
problems at points in his or her career. Understanding how lawyers confront these
problems may provide clues as to how they might be assisted to better resolve
those problems in the future.
The novel ethical questions faced by Abel's lawyers were varied. Furtzaig had
to decide what to do when his client rejected a settlement demand (remodeling a
kitchen) because it might reveal lead paint contamination in an apartment; the
client's decision apparently led to a series of events that culminated in Furtzaig's
failure to restore the case to the court's docket. Byler encountered a novel
situation when helping a friend with a tax shelter problem on a reduced fee basis;
a fee dispute arose when Byler used the client's tax refund to pay himself, and it
escalated when he refused to escrow the disputed funds. Similarly, Wisehart
encountered a novel problem when a client unexpectedly took opposing
counsel's privileged documents from a conference table; he ran into trouble when
he attempted to use the documents to his client's advantage.
In each case the lawyers engaged in conscious decisionmaking, but they
resolved the novel questions incorrectly. In all three cases, their first mistakes
were made without consultation with ethics experts and seemingly without
consideration of the applicable ethical rules. To the extent they subsequently
sought advice from other lawyers, the advice was apparently incomplete or flat-
out wrong. The biggest problem, however, was not the advice received, but the
self-interested prism through which the lawyers viewed the facts.
Psychological research reveals that this is not surprising, because when there is
a conflict between an individual's interest and those of others, the individual will
favor himself. Perceptions and expectations are biased in a self-serving manner
supra note 10, at 71-72, 74-75, 103. Overoptimism about his ability to deal with his caseload during his illness
may have contributed to his neglect. Nevertheless, Abel's description of Kreitzer's practice suggests that he did
not intend to do much work on most of his cases and may have been motivated more by greed than by
psychological biases. Id. at 96.
128. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
2009] 1565
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETH-cs
called egocentrism.'29 This bias causes people who are exposed to identical
information to interpret it in ways that favor themselves. Egocentrism allows
people to believe that it is fair for them to have more of a given resource than an
independent observer would judge.1 30 Egocentricism also causes individuals to
overstate the role that they have played in events in which they have par-
ticipated. 13
1
Egocentrism also helps to explain why "people tend to conflate that which is
personally beneficial with What is fair and moral."' 32 "When there are competing
norms of fairness, [people] select as relevant those that materially favor them-
selves."' 133 Individuals first determine their preference for an outcome on the
basis of self interest and then justify this preference on the basis of "fairness" by
differentially weighting factors in a manner that favors their self-interest.' 34
When there is ambiguity about the consequences of alternatives, people will
rationalize taking the option that is personally preferable as opposed to the one
that is ethically more justifiable.
Once people reach a conclusion that coincides with their intuitions or their
self-interest, they tend to pay more attention to information confirming the
correctness of the decision than negative information. 13 5 Indeed, overconfidence
in decisionmaking arises from the tendency people have to recruit reasons from
memory that confirm their hypotheses. 136 This is part of the confirmation bias,
which causes individuals to pick out information that confirms or supports their
tentative decisions and reject or downplay evidence that does not. 137
Philip Byler's behavior illustrates a host of self-serving biases that guided his
decisionmaking when confronted with a novel situation. Byler was faced with
ambiguous facts concerning whether his client had knowingly agreed to give his
full tax refund to Byler in gratitude for Byler's handling of his case-and Byler
interpreted the situation in a manner that aligned with his own interests. Byler had
orally agreed to a flat fee of up to $20,000 if he needed to litigate a tax shelter
issue for James Morgan, a family friend.138 When it turned out that not only did
Byler not have to litigate with the IRS over Morgan's claimed $180,000 tax
deficiency, but his negotiations might produce a refund, Morgan allegedly told
129. See, e.g., BAZEMAN, supra note 107, at 70-72; Daniel T. Gilbert & Joel Cooper, Social Psychological
Strategies of Self-Deception, in SELF-DECEMON AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING, supra note 103, at 75.
130. See BA.RmAN & MOORE, supra note 86, at 94; Moore et al., supra note 35, at 7-8.
131. See Rachlinski, supra note 106, at 1172.
132. See Loewenstein, supra note 96, at 221.
133. Id. at 222.
134. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 86, at 94.
135. Id. at 82; PLous, supra note 87, at 234.
136. Koehler et al., supra note 111, at 692; PLous, supra note 87, at 234.
137. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 86, at 29-30; Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and
Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 880, 889-90 (1975).
138. ABEL, supra note 10, at 290-91.
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him, "if we do get a check, keep it.' 139 At that point, neither thought the
likelihood of a refund was great or knew the amount of any possible refund.' 4
Morgan, who was working in South Africa at that time, met with Byler in June
1994 and left him with a bank deposit ticket and a signed blank check, the
purpose of which was disputed. While Morgan testified he did this to pay for any
tax deficiency, Byler claimed it was to enable Byler to deposit the tax refund and
to then pay himself with the refund.1 4 1 When a $52,917 tax refund check arrived
in October 1994, Byler deposited the check in Morgan's account and used the
blank check to pay himself almost the entire amount. After the check had cleared,
Byler wrote to Morgan explaining what he had done. 142 He believed it "fair" to
take the refund even though he had never told Morgan that the refund might
exceed $50,000.143 Abel's account makes clear that Byler had no doubt about the
"fairness" of his actions. When Morgan disputed Byler's right to the refund,
Byler was adamant that he was entitled to the money, and he refused to deposit
the funds into an escrow account.144
Byler viewed this as a novel situation and it was-for him. As he stated in the
disciplinary hearing, "I was handling banking documents I had never handled
before in that way ...." He was "uncomfortable" because "I had never been
given this kind of payment mechanism before."1 45 He spoke with Louis Lauer,
his "older, old fashioned colleague of the last four years" immediately after the
June 1994 conversation between Byler and Morgan. Lauer, who was of counsel
to the same small firm as Byler, recalled being concerned whether the refund
would be adequate to cover the outstanding work-for a result that he thought
was "extraordinary"-but testified that with respect to the deposit ticket and the
blank check, he "didn't know how [Byler] could do that." 146 It is possible that
Lauer didn't clearly express his concerns or that Byler did not hear them because
of the confirmation bias. Byler may have only attended to feedback that
confirmed his conclusions and failed to register Lauer's reservations.
Before Byler sent the October 1994 letter to James Morgan explaining what he
had done with the refund, he asked Louis Lauer, as well as Byler's wife (who was
also a lawyer) to review the letter. They "fully agree[d]" with the letter. 147 Byler
also spoke with Lauer about his decision not to put the money in escrow once he
learned that Morgan disputed his right to the funds. Byler testified that he did not
put the funds in escrow because he thought that doing so would be an admission
139. Id. at 293.
140. Id. at 293-95.
141. Id. at 294-95.
142. Id. at 296.
143. Id. at 297-98.
144. Id. at 299-304.
145. Id. at 301.
146. Id. at 318.
147. Id. at 301.
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of guilt.148 He claimed that "I did rely on the advice of Lou Lauer... it was a
difficult situation because I don't handle client funds, I don't have an escrow
... so it's a foreign matter to me ....
Byler made a serious error in his handling of client funds. Although it is hard to
believe that he was unfamiliar with the rules requiring the scrupulous treatment
of disputed funds,1 50 it is conceivable that he never learned them. During his first
dozen years in private practice, he worked in large firms, 151 where he probably
was not required to personally maintain a client trust account. His subsequent law
practice may not have required him to hold client funds. After the dispute arose,
he received unsolicited advice from a legal ethics expert-Thomas Morgan,
James Morgan's brothert 52-but he flatly rejected the advice that the money must
be deposited in a trust account. 153 Byler's thinking was no doubt influenced by
the fact that he needed the money. 154 Self-serving biases-including the
confirmation bias and overconfidence in his judgments-caused Byler to
continue down the disastrous path on which he had embarked.
Arthur Wisehart's case involved a truly novel question with which lawyers are
not typically faced, i.e., what does a lawyer do when a client surreptitiously takes
opposing counsel's privileged documents off a conference room table in a
hard-fought. sexual harassment lawsuit? When this question arose for Wisehart,
there was no clear answer to that question. 155 Upon learning during a lunchtime
deposition break that his client, Joan Lipin, had spent an hour reading documents
148. Id. at 328-30. It is also possible that Byler could not do so because it would acknowledge that he had
been wrong, and Byler could not accept the possibility of mistake or criticism. See generally Richard, supra
note 30, at 3 (describing lawyer hypersensitivity to criticism).
149. ld. at 330.
150. The New York Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Funds belonging in part to a client or third person and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or
law firm shall be kept in such special account or accounts, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or
law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed
by the client or third person, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the
dispute is finally resolved.
N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONStBulrY DR 9-102(B)(4)[1200.46]. Byler's later explanation for not
placing the funds in a special account was that there was no "dispute" with the client because Morgan could not
rightly claim the funds.
151. ABEL, supra note 10, at 290.
152. Thomas D. Morgan is a law professor at George Washington Law School and a well-known legal ethics
scholar. At the time of the dispute, he had already authored one of the most widely used casebooks on pro-
fessional iesponsibility. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 1991).
153. While the advice was prescient, it was also threatening, which probably contributed to Byler's failure to
heed it. Thomas Morgan warned concerning the need to escrow the money that "[i]f you do not follow that
procedure in your practice you are playing Russian Roulette with your career." ABEL, supra note 10, at 308.
154. Id. at 325.
155. It was not until 1992 that the American Bar Association opined on the obligation of a lawyer who
inadvertently obtained privileged documents belonging to an adversary. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I
Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992). Moreover, the answer to that question has changed over time. See,
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that she said were left in front of her on a conference table by opposing counsel
Weil Gotschal & Manges ("WGM"), Wisehart's first reaction was "that she had
the right to do that. That they were right in front of her." 156 Wisehart immediately
told Lipin that "he had had a federal case by which his client had been going
through documents that had been produced" and found a smoking gun document
and "by the nature of that the privilege had been waived." 157 He continued to rely
on that case to justify his right to read and use WGM's documents, even though
there is an obvious distinction between inadvertent delivery of documents to a
party and the surreptitious removal of documents from opposing counsel's
conference table. Wisehart subsequently attempted to use the documents to
extract a settlement from the opposing side and refused to relinquish them.
158
While Wisehart ultimately encountered more discipline problems because of the
way in which he litigated the issues thereafter, his approach to the ethical issue
concerning the privileged documents is instructive.
Although Wisehart thought he knew the answer to the novel question, he had
Lipin-who recently had also been working for him as a paralegal-copy
approximately 200 pages of material and place copies in sealed envelopes so that
he could get a second opinion before reading them.1 59 He did, however, allow
Lipin to take home a copy of the documents to continue reading them, thinking
they might have been the documents that WGM had been ordered (but refused) to
produce in the case. 160 He spent part of the weekend researching the legal status
of the documents based on his understanding of what the documents contained.
He then called two attorneys to get a second opinion about how best to proceed,
but they declined to become involved. 161 On his third attempt, he contacted Ned
Purves, who had referred the client to Wisehart, and was of counsel to Wisehart's
firm. 162 Together, Byler and Purves opened the envelope and read the documents
which were both clearly privileged and embarrassing for WGM's clients.
1 63
Wisehart and Purves subsequently met with WGM lawyers and told them that
Lipin was keeping a copy over which he had no control and which she might
release to the press.164 Wisehart further outlined a proposed settlement-which
e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005) (withdrawing ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992)).
156. ABEL, supra note 10, at 401.
157. Id. at 402-03.
158. Id at 406, 409-11.
159. Id. at 403.
160. Id at 403-04.
161. Id. at 404, 461, 483.
162. Id. at 390.
163. Id. at 406-07. The documents included memoranda written by WGM attorneys to the files about
meetings and interviews they conducted with employees of their client. Id. at 401, 410. The documents further
revealed information about an affair between the General Manager of WGM's client and a subordinate and other
statements revealing that the client was engaged in ongoing sexual harassment of female executives. Id. at 407.
164. Id. at 409.
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was immediately rejected-and WGM demanded the return of all copies of the
papers.165 Wisehart refused to comply.
At the time of the misconduct that led to discipline, Byler and Wisehart were
experienced lawyers. They had graduated from Harvard and Michigan Law
Schools, respectively, had both worked early in their careers in "white shoe" law
firms, and had never before been disciplined. 166 Both reached out for some help
when they confronted a novel problem, but not far enough. They only talked with
individuals who had some stake in the outcome of the matter and not to impartial
ethics experts. In Byler's case, he spoke to his wife and to a lawyer who was
affiliated with his law firm. In Wisehart's case, he spoke with a colleague who
was in a position to obtain a referral fee if the case ended favorably. It may be that
they subconsciously reached out to people who would confirm their initial
self-interested judgments. While Wisehart initially conducted some research on
the question of what to do with the "sealed" documents, he ensured he would
learn what was in the documents by allowing his client to take a set home and
read them. 167 Various self-serving biases appear to have affected the decisionmak-
ing of both of these lawyers, including overconfidence in their predictions about
how their judgments would ultimately be viewed by others. They also evaluated
ambiguous evidence in a self-serving fashion in order to reach a conclusion that
favored them. In Byler's case, he interpreted Morgan's statement, "if we do get a
check, keep it" to mean that he could later write a check to himself for more than
$50,000, even though they had no idea that this large a sum might be refunded at
the time Morgan made the statement. In Wisehart's case, he interpreted a
situation where documents were left out on a conference table to support the
conclusion that WGM had deliberately placed them in front of Lipin for her to
find. The lawyers justified their self-serving decisions by using "fairness" and
other reasoning that favored them. They seemed to be unaware of their
self-serving biases and they declined to reconsider the wisdom of their decisions,
to their serious detriment.
C. THE POWER OF COMMITMENT AND SELF-DECEPTION
Abel found that "[o]nce these lawyers committed themselves to an action, they
found it difficult to change course."'16 8 The power of commitment to a course of
action helps to explain the persistence of undesirable conduct once it first occurs
165. Id. at410-11.
166. Id. at 290, 300, 315,449,457.
167. Id. at 403-04. Indeed, Disciplinary Counsel argued that even before reading the documents and talking
to Purves, "[Wisehart] already has a plan. He's going to use'these documents to attempt a settlement" favorable
to Ms. Lipin. He further observed, "[e]very opportunity Mr. Wisehart had to seek the conservative safe plan, he
disregarded it." Id. at 455-56.
168. Id. at 494.
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and the "hardening" of unethical behavior that Ditton reported. 169 Moreover,
once a belief is formed, it can .be difficult to erase. 7° Various psychological
processes prevent people from rethinking most of their decisions once a decision
is made. People use scripts and other forms of cognitive simplifitation so they do
not constantly rethink their decisions. 171 People may also lack the motivation to
revisit their choices due to self-serving biases. 172 Overconfidence and overopti-
mism may cause people to believe they are making good decisions and do not
need to rethink how to approach a problem they have already resolved. 173
Commitment to a prior decision may also occur because people want to view
themselves as good and consistent decisionmakers. 174 This is due to their need to
see themselves-and to be seen by others-in a positive light. This need helps to
explain why managers who commit to a project are motivated to focus on the
project's upside more than its downside risks and will resist acknowledging that a
mistake has been made.1 75 Indeed, people have a tendency to escalate their
commitment to a previously decided course of action. 176 Bazerman describes
"nonrational escalation" as the "degree to which an individual escalates com-
mitment to a previously selected course of action to a point beyond which a
rational-model of decision making would prescribe." 177
Once a person commits an unethical act-even reluctantly-cognitive disso-
nance makes it easier to continue the behavior. Cognitive dissonance theory
suggests that the pressure people feel to behave consistently will often lead them
to bring their beliefs in line with their behavior.1 78 For example, engaging in
deviant behavior such as shoplifting has been shown to soften the moral
evaluation of the behavior and enhance the acceptance of rationalizations for it,
thereby facilitating future deviance. 179 As Elliot Aronson has noted, "[i]f you
want people to soften their moral attitudes toward some misdeed, tempt them to
perform the misdeed."'18 Once a person performs a misdeed, the individual will
gradually develop an increasingly entrenched view that the conduct being
169. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
170. Ross et al., supra note 137, at 880; Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and
Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 122 (1994).
171. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; Langevoort, supra note 43, at 639-40.
172. Rachlinski, supra note 106, at 1222.
173. Id. at 1220.
174. Roderick M. Kramer & David M. Messick, Ethical Cognition and the Framing of Organizational
Dilemmas: Decision Makers as Intuitive Lawyers, in CODES OF CoNDuc'r, supra note 96, at 59, 69-70.
175. Langevoort, supra note 43, at 642.
176. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 86, at 101-03; Moore et al., supra note 35, at 8.
177. BAzERMAN & MOORE, supra note 86, at 102.
178. PLous, supra note 87, at 30; Gilbert & Cooper, supra note 129, at 84; Ashfortb & Anand, supra note 35,
at 29.
179. Ashforth & Anand, supra note 35, at 30.
180. Aronson, supra note 57, at 203.
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engaged in is appropriate. 18
Self-deception also permits people to continue on an unethical course without
consciously recognizing the consequences of their actions. Self-deception in-
cludes "avoidance of the truth [and] the lies that we tell to... ourselves."'' 82 Ann
Tenbrunsel and David Messick argue that self-deception is an important part of
the process of "ethical fading," which causes individuals to no longer "see" the
moral components of their decisions. Through self-deception, the moral implica-
tions of a decision fade, allowing individuals to continue to behave unethically
and at the same time, not realize they are doing so. 18 3 By avoiding or disguising
the moral implications of a decision, individuals can behave in a self-interested
fashion and still cling to the belief that they are ethical. 184 This self-deception is
-accomplished through, inter alia, the use of euphemistic language to describe
unethical conduct, 85 "psychological numbing" that comes from repetition of
behavior, routinization that results in the loss of "ethical coloration," and self-
biased errors in perceptual causation that permit people to distance themselves
from the ethical issue. 1
86
It is therefore not surprising that Abel found that once the lawyers he studied
committed themselves to an action, "they found it difficult to change course" and
sometimes engaged in "profound self-deception.' 87 Thus, once Kreitzer started
down the path of a high volume practice that included participation in the ten
percenter scheme, he apparently did not consider turning back and continued to
pay a middleman, even after he knew he was under investigation. As he sub-
sequently explained, "my head was in the ground."'188 Muto's continued willing-
ness to work with travel agencies-even once he left his original employer-can
be explained by the fact that he had already engaged in this form of practice and
did not reconsider the wisdom of his choice, even though he was aware that
immigrants were often ill-served by travel agencies. 189
Furtzaig's case also illustrates the power of commitment to a course of conduct
and the self-deception that permits it to continue. Furtzaig had worked hard in a
highly pressurized office environment to become a non-equity partner in his law
firm. When he failed to restore two cases to the calendar--either because of ne-
glect or because he was simjgly uncertain about how to deal with them-he faced
181. See Ashforth & Anand, supra note 35, at 30; Levin, supra note 48, at 376-77.
182. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 95, at 225.
183. Id. at 223, 224.
184. Id. at 225.
185. For instance, the term "aggressive" litigation tactics may obscure the fact that the tactics are also
unethical. See generally id. at 226 (noting that accountants engage in "aggressive" accounting practices, not
illegal ones).
186. Id. at 226-31; Ashforth & Anand, supra note 35, at 11-14; Bandura, supra note 34, at 196, 199.
187. ABEL, supra note 10, at 494.
188. Id. at93.
189. Id. at 178.
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an enormous problem. Psychological research shows that when confronted with
the choice between a guaranteed loss of income and status and the chance of a
more severe penalty in the future, people opt for the risky but less certain
option. t90 Thus, it is not surprising that when Furtzaig was confronted with the
choice between a guaranteed loss of face within the firm (and possibly loss of the
chance of becoming an equity partner) versus the speculative possibility of later
being caught, he chose to take his chances and cover up the problem. It was no
doubt less difficult for Furtzaig to conceal his neglect the next time it occurred.
He subsequently hid his neglect in several other cases by forging documents and
lying to his clients.' 9l He later noted, "[i]n retrospect, of course, I couldn't hide it.
It was stupid. It was absurd to even think that I could."1 92 It appears that
overconfidence, the power of commitment, and self-deception were all at work in
Furtzaig's case. 
193
1I. LAWYER DISCIPLINE, PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES,
AND DISCIPLINE CULTURE
As Rick Abel notes, in order to continue their deviant behavior, the lawyers he
studied constructed an "alternative reality" in which they operated. 194 He found
that the lawyers often did not see the problems with their own conduct and
blamed other people when things went wrong. For example, Joseph Muto con-
vinced himself not only that his failure to file papers on time or to appear in court
for his clients was not his fault, but also that he was providing a great, low-cost
service to immigrants in Chinatown. 195 Similarly, Philip Byler believed that he
was entitled to take money from his client's tax refund in "fair payment" for his
services, even after he received dire warnings about the consequences of his
failure to escrow the disputed funds. 196 Commitment to a course of conduct and
self-deception allowed these behaviors to persist. Once these lawyers became
involved in lawyer discipline proceedings, their judgments often became even
more distorted.
190. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Moore et al., supra note 35, at 8; Painter, supra note 43, at 1415-24.
191. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
192. ABEL, supra note 10, at 198.
193. Furtzaig reported that he was suicidal when his deception was first revealed and possibly for couple of
years before that. Id. at 198-99. While this suggests that Furtzaig may have been aware that what he had been
doing was wrong, his quoted comment suggests that self-deception enabled him to believe that he would be able
to conceal his wrongdoing.
194. Id. at 494.
195. Id. at 166-67, 176.
196. Id. at 297.
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A. PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND LAWYER DISCIPLINE
Abel observes that for most of the lawyers he studied, the discipline process
intensified self-righteousness.1 97 It is important to remember that he selected
"extreme" cases and that the intense self-righteousness these lawyers displayed is
part of what made them "extreme." But in some respects, their conduct is not
surprising. There is evidence that lawyers may have less resilience and ego
strength than the general population, making them more defensive and hyper-
sensitive to criticism.198 Moreover, most people have a powerful desire to view
themselves in a positive light and are motivated to behave in ways that maintain
their self-esteem.1 99 Self-esteem is seriously threatened once a lawyer finds
himself in discipline proceedings.
Psychological research confirms that when things go wrong, many people look
for someone else to blame. As Charles Snyder noted, "excuses have typically
been conceived as mechanics for deceiving other people," but they are "also
aimed at the internal audience of oneself."200 Excuse making is a common
strategy for reconciling the conflict between a person's belief that he is a good
person and the fact that he is responsible for a negative outcome.2"1 When people
commit bad deeds, they frame the facts to try to convince themselves that the
deed was not so bad or attribute the responsibility to others.20 2 The worse the
event, "[t]he greater is our desire to find an evildoer behind the act-particularly
an evildoer who does not implicate us." 203
People use reframing strategies to shift blame and to maintain self-esteem.
These strategies include underestimating the harm they have done, derogating the
victim so that it is not a negative act to hurt a "bad" person, or derogating the
source of the negative feedback (e.g., a judge who considers a lawyer's behavior
problematic).20 4 Blaming adversaries or circumstances also serves self-
exonerative purposes. As Albert Bandura explains:
In this process, people view themselves as faultless victims driven to injurious
conduct by forcible provocation. Punitive conduct is, thus, seen as a justifiable
reaction to belligerent provocations .... Victims then get blamed for bringing
suffering on themselves. Self-exoneration is also achievable by viewing one's
harmful conduct as forced by compelling circumstances rather than as a
197. Id. at 507. The sole exception among the lawyers Abel describes was Furtzaig, who did not deny his
wrongdoing. Id. at 205.
198. See supra note 30.
199. See supra notes 10 1-105 and accompanying text; BAZERMAN & MooRE, supra note 86, at 90; Leary &
Downs, supra note 102, at 129.
200. Snyder, supra note 103, at 35.
201. Id at 37.
202. Benabou & Trole, supra note 102, at 885.
203. Benforado & Hanson, supra note 33, at 325.
204. Snyder, supra note 103, at 38-39.
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personal decision. By fixing blame on others or on circumstances, not only are
one's own injurious actions excusable, but one can feel self-righteous in the
process.205
In addition, the argument that "everyone is doing it" (used by Muto and Kreitzer
in their discipline proceedings) 2°6 not only suggests that the act is not so bad, but
it also lessens the sense of responsibility for the act.2°7
This type of reframing and blaming to preserve a positive self-image can be
seen in many of the responses by Abel's lawyers to the suggestion that they
engaged in misconduct. For example, Byler attacked his client Morgan and
portrayed him as "ungrateful" and "dishonest" when Morgan first suggested that
Byler had wrongfully taken the tax refund for himself.208 Byler continued to
derogate the victim in the disciplinary proceedings, portraying him as a "chronic
tax evader," who had committed a "breach of trust," and was "trying to destroy
my career and my ability to support my family." 2°9 When Departmental Dis-
ciplinary Committee ("DDC") Counsel staff attorney Mady Edelstein recom-
mended a private admonition, Byler wrote a letter to DDC chief counsel to reject
the recommendation and complain about Edelstein's "mistaken and sometimes
jaundiced view" of the matter.2 0 This pattern of attacking the decisionmaker who
provided negative feedback on Byler's conduct continued throughout the
disciplinary process, when Byler attacked members of the hearing panel and
others for being "out of touch with the law," for being "biased," and for "twisting
and distorting facts."2 n Byler's defense was marked by voluminous and
intemperate filings. As Abel notes: "He was the injured party, who had been
'unfairly attacked,' 'put in an unfair situation,' and 'didn't think it was right'....
He wasn't responsible. 212 Byler was not, however, simply engaged in excuse
making for an audience; this excuse making also seems aimed at preserving
Byler's own self-image.
Studies of accountability-i.e., the expectation that individuals will be called
upon to justify their conduct to others-also suggest why lawyers become
entrenched in their positions during the discipline process. As Philip Tetlock
explains, "[a]ccountability is a critical norm-enforcement mechanism--the social
psychological link between individual decision makers on the once hand and
205. Bandura, supra note 34, at 203.
206. ABEL, supra note 10, at 102, 171.
207. Snyder, supra note 103, at 42.
208. ABEL, supra note 10, at 306, 313.
209. Id. at 316, 353.
210. Id. at 314.
211. Id. at 357-58.
212. Id. at 360 (emphasis in original).
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social systems on the other., 2 13 Tetlock's social contingency model of account-
ability predicts self-justifying thinking when decisionmakers are accountable to a
skeptical or hostile audience for actions that are not reversible or are implausible
to deny.2
14
Tetlock's studies have shown how a minor change in the timing of accountabil-
ity can determine whether an individual engages in pre-emptive self-criticism (to
consider the wisdom of proceeding with an activity) or the strategy of "defensive
bolstering" (once a decisionmaker has already acted on the decision). He
observes that "[o]nce people had publicly committed themselves to a position, a
major function of thought became generating justifications for those posi-
tions."21 Subjects were less likely to concede legitimacy to other points of view
and generated more reasons why they were right and why critics were .wrong.
This research may help to explain Byler's behavior as well as Wisehart's
conduct concerning the privileged documents his client removed from a
conference table. Once Wisehart decided to read the documents and then use
them to try to extract a settlement in a hotly contested litigation, he became
publicly committed to a course of conduct for which he was accountable. After
that point, he generated self-justifying explanations for his position: He initially
blamed opposing counsel, arguing that the documents were left deliberately for
his client to see, and he vilified WGM for not previously producing the docu-
ments.2 16 Once decisionmakers started to conclude that Wisehart had behaved
improperly, he then began to attack them personally. Thus, he argued that Justice
Karla Moskowitz was unable to decide a contempt motion against him dis-
passionately because she was biased and dealing with breast cancer; he argued
that federal judge Leonard Sand should recuse himself when Wisehart's efforts to
replead his dismissed state court claims in federal court were rebuffed; he argued
that the chair of the Disciplinary panel should recuse himself because of "malice"
and some perceived conflict of interest; and he argued that Chief Justice Kaye of
the New York Court of Appeals was biased due to her relationship with Justice
Moskowitz.2 t7
Abel finds parallels between Wisehart's behavior and what David Shapiro calls
the "paranoid style." '218 Shapiro describes the paranoid as one who "looks at the
213. Philip E. Tetlock, Politicians, Theologians and Prosecutors: Exploring the Empirical Implications of
Deviant Functionalist Metaphors, in Hoausncs AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITVE JUDGMENT, supra
note 84, at 583.
214. Id. at 583,586.
215. Id. at 587.
216. While far-fetched, Wisehart's view that the documents had been deliberately placed where his client
would see them was shared by his client and the referring lawyer, and therefore not completely delusional.
ABEL, supra note 10, at 429, 439, 461. Of course, both of those individuals had self-interested reasons for
supporting Wisehart's views.
217. Id. at 428-29, 434, 438, 444-47, 451,466. Wisehart attacked the decisionmakers in other cases, id. at
475, but he did it with particular ferocity in this case.
218. Id. at 480.
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world with fixed and preoccupying expectation, and he searches repetitively, and
only, for confirmation of it." 219 Not surprisingly, he loses a sense of proportion. It
is not clear, however, whether Wisehart previously displayed a paranoid style or
gradually developed one in this case because of the situation in which he found
himself and the psychological processes at work.22° Wisehart already believed
that the underlying sexual harassment suit was not fairly litigated because of
WGM's obstructionist litigation tactics. 22' He was probably correct in that
assessment.222 This sense of unfairness was no doubt exacerbated when his
client's strong sexual harassment lawsuit was dismissed due to Wisehart's mis-
handling of the privileged documents. In light of this perceived unfairness, it is
not altogether surprising that he had difficulty accepting the decisions against
him when he was defending himself in disciplinary proceedings.
Abel finds parallels between the conduct of white collar criminals and
disciplined attorneys, who often remain convinced of their own innocence.223 I
suspect that disciplined lawyers' reactions may be typical of a broader segment of
society. Many people resort to blame and excuse making when confronted with
evidence of their own misconduct. They deny causing harm, attack their
accusers, and resort to other techniques to minimize their responsibility for their
conduct.224 While some of the lawyers Abel describes displayed extreme forms
of this behavior, the genesis of much of their conduct can be explained by
common psychological processes.
219. David Shapiro, NEuRoTIc STYLEs 56 (1999).
220. Shapiro describes paranoid characters as those in whom "paranoid traits of suspiciousness are both
pervasive and longstanding." Suspiciousness as a mode of thinking is "chronic and habitual." Id. at 55. It is not
possible to determine from the case studies whether Wisehart had long displayed this mode of thinking or began
to demonstrate it once his, self-esteem was under attack. Although Wisehart unsuccessfully brought recusal
motions in some other litigations-suggesting the possibility of a paranoid style-it is not clear whether that
conduct actually reflected a paranoid style in those cases or a calculated litigation strategy.
221. ABEL, supra note 10, at 393-97. Abel notes that Wisehart may have harbored "the resentment common
among small firm practitioners toward the resources, pretensions and condescension of Wall Street giants" like
WGM. Id. at 480. He may be correct, but it appears the resentment went deeper than that because of the "Rambo
litigator approach" employed by the large law firm. Id. at 394.
222. At one point, the judge chastised WGM's lawyers after they made what she viewed as an unnecessary
motion stating, "I am going to start imposing costs. You get paid if you make these motions, right, you bill your
client, and I don't think the plaintiff's counsel can do that. So I don't think it is fair to motion somebody to death
so that the person can't continue a case." Id. at 393.
223. Id. at 508-09.
224. It is possible to think of many politicians, sports figures and movie celebrities who engage in this
behavior. A recent example includes former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, who perjured himself at a civil
trial in order to hide his wrongdoing, including his extramarital affair with his chief of staff. Kilpatrick initially
denied wrongdoing, minimized the significance of what he had done, claimed selective prosecution, and blamed
others for improperly producing the text messages that revealed his perjury. See, e.g., Remarks by Kilpatrick,
lawyer at news conference, DETorr NEws, Mar. 25, 2008; Robert Snell, Webb to Challenge Text Messages,
Kilpatrick attorney says release may be illegal, DETorr NEws, Mar. 26, 2008, at 6A.
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B. THE CULTURE OF THE LAWYER DISCIPLINE PROCESS
Psychological research suggests why the tendency for some lawyers to
self-justify is especially strong once they find themselves in disciplinary
proceedings. Not only do lawyers want to maintain a positive self-image, they
wish to be seen as good lawyers by their peers who sit on the discipline hearing
panels.225 Lawyers may quickly conclude, however, that the process is hostile
and unfair. Their sense of unfairness is probably exacerbated when they represent
themselves in those proceedings and there is no one to provide a check on their
self-serving biases.
Even before lawyers are drawn into disciplinary proceedings, the discipline
process is not viewed in a positive light by many lawyers. The process in New
York is slow and byzantine, provoking high anxiety for those who are awaiting
disposition of complaints that have been filed against them. As one lawyer stated:
I got a complaint. It is easy to get a complaint in this business, and it is stressful,
it's not like-there are some of us that do bad things, and I am not saying that
there is no need for it, but it is a really-you don't even understand how
stressful that it is. That is like very stressful. You can't even do any work it's so
stressful.226
New York lawyers have described their dealings with the DDC-even when they
were not sanctioned-with some bitterness.22 7 The process is not transparent, the
committee members are sometimes officious, the sanctions are inconsistent, and
the entire process is often not perceived as fair.
The perception that the lawyer discipline process is unfair is particularly
prevalent among solo and small firm lawyers.228 These lawyers receive more than
ninety percent of all discipline, even though they comprise only about forty-five
percent of all practicing lawyers. 229 The reasons for this are complex and may not
reflect actual bias in the discipline system, but solo and small firm practitioners
often think otherwise.2 30 As one small firm New York lawyer stated:
[W]hen you look at them, when you read the decisions as I do, it's a dis-
proportionate number of solo guys who get nailed and I don't believe in a
heartbeat that Wall Street guys are so much more ethical. I don't believe that
225. The panels are composed mostly of lawyers. In some of the cases Abel describes, all of the panel
members were lawyers.
226. Levin, supra note 48, at 372.
227. Id.
228. ABEL, supra note 10, at 505; Levin, supra note 8, at 6.
229. See CLARA N. CARSON, LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000, 28-29'
(2004); see also Levin, supra note 48, at 313.
230. ABEL, supra note 10, at 505-06; CALIFORNIA STATE BAR, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
DISCIPLINARY COMPLArrs AGAINST ATrORNEYS IN SOLO PRACTICE, SMALL SIZE LAW FIRMS AND LARGE SIZE
LAW FIRMS (2001), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/reports/2001-SB143-Report.pdf (last
visited May 28, 2009).
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they notarize legitimately every document that goes in their [papers]. I don't
believe that they don't futz around with escrow money or you know-not
intentionally, not bad stuff, but this little stuff. I think the solos-they get killed.
Killed.23 1
The belief that the discipline system is not fair is problematic, because the
perception that a process is fair has been linked to decision acceptance.232 In
other words, when third party decisions are viewed as fairly made, people are
more willing to accept them as just.233 Procedural justice includes the perceived
quality of the decision making process and the interpersonal treatment by
authorities.234 In order to gain voluntary acceptance of decisions, it is also
important for people to believe that the motives of legal authorities are
trustworthy. 2
35
It appears that some of Abel's lawyers were unable to accept the decisions
rendered in their disciplinary proceedings because they perceived the process as
unfair. Wisehart expressly raised the unfairness of the process, noting the DDC's
failure to discipline Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys for somewhat similar
misconduct a few years earlier in In re Beiny.2 36 Indeed, in the Beiny case,
Sullivan & Cromwell was disqualified after it improperly obtained privileged
documents through deliberate deceit,237 but no lawyer from the white shoe firm
was disciplined. In 1993, when New York's Appellate Division affirmed dis-
missal of Lipin's sexual harassment case because of the mishandling of WGM's
documents, it noted that the behavior with respect to obtaining those documents
had not been premeditated as it had been in Beiny.238 Wisehart's lawyer argued in
connection with Wisehart's disciplinary proceeding that no Sullivan & Cromwell
lawyer had been disciplined in Beiny and that:
It therefore appears that the targets of such self-initiated proceedings by staff
counsel are predominantly small firm practitioners such as Mr. Wisehart rather
than large firm lawyers who nevertheless are compensated exorbitant amounts
and are shown to have skated on thin ice with respect to ethical violations. The
result is denial of equal protection and due process for Mr. Wisehart .... 239
231. Levin, supra note 48, at 372.
232. Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and Recidivism: The Engagement of
Offenders'Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 L. & Soc'y
REv. 553, 557 (2007).
233. TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY
AND BEHAvIoRAL ENGAGEMENT 74 (2000); see also TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 57 (2002).
234. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice,
Social Identity and Cooperative Behavior, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REv. 349; 351 (2003).
235. TYLER & HUo, supra note 233, at 7, 58.
236. In re Beiny, 517 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y App. Div. 1987).
237. Id. at 483-85.
238. ABEL, supra note 10, at 440.
239. Id. at 453.
20091 1579
THE GEORGETOWN JOuRNAL OF LEGAL ETmcs
Claims of unfair treatment of solo practitioners in the disciplinary process
permeated Wisehart's discipline submissions.24° In light of the perceived un-
fairness, it is unsurprising that Wisehart was unwilling to accept the recom-
mended sanction and pursued a third litigation in federal court in which he
named, inter alia, the chair of the DDC hearing panel and continued to complain
about a "conspiracy" to destroy small firm lawyers.24'
Muto also believed he was the victim of an unfair discipline process. He
claimed selective prosecution, pointing to the fact that other immigration lawyers
in the community had "extensive involvement" with travel agencies but had not
been disciplined for assisting the unauthorized practice of law.242 Although Muto
conveniently ignored the fact that he was also charged with serious neglect of
client matters, he did have a point. New York authorities had been turning a blind
eye for years to the fact that Chinatown's travel agencies were engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law and that some immigration lawyers were helping
them do so. Indeed, when I interviewed New York City immigration lawyers in
2006, some reported with frustration that they had attempted to complain-to no
avail-to the New York attorney general's office, the district attorney's office and
the DDC about travel agencies. Moreover, the fact that some lawyers worked
with travel agencies was obvious and well-known by immigration judges. As one
lawyer noted, "it's not hard to spot." He continued:
They take these people in groups around to the courtrooms, and you will see
them walking in groups, with a Chinese person who's not an attorney, who is
the leader, who is from the agency, taking them around. And you'll see these
people also handing files to the lawyer outside the courtroom.243
The failure to discipline other lawyers for working with travel agencies no doubt
contributed to Muto's view of himself as a victim.
Several-of the lawyers Abel describes-including Byler (at times), Kreitzer,
and Muto-also committed one of the biggest mistakes that can be made in a
disciplinary case: they represented themselves during the discipline proceedings.
This is not uncommon, as many of the lawyers subject to discipline are solo and
small firm practitioners who cannot afford the cost of legal representation. But
the results can be disastrous. For example, Byler was his own worst enemy in the
disciplinary process. He parlayed a case that could have been resolved with a
private admonition into one that resulted in more than a one-year suspension
from practice. 24' During the discipline proceedings, he was incapable of doing
240. Id. at 454-55.
241. Id. at 466, 469.
242. Id. at 105-06, 171.
243. Interview with anonymous immigration attorney in Cranford, NJ (Aug. 16, 2006).
244. The sanction imposed was a one-year suspension, but because Byler was unable to express remorse
when he applied for reinstatement, the actual period of suspension was longer. ABEL, supra note 10, at 334,337,
342-48.
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for himself what lawyers are paid to do-which is to step outside of the situation
and critically consider how he might be perceived by the hearing panel. He could
not even behave like a lawyer and instead, interrupted panel members, evaded
their questions and disregarded their rulings on numerous occasions.245 Reading
about Byler's self-defense in the hearing leaves no serious doubt that his failure
to understand the culture of the First Department Disciplinary Committee, and
his inability to accept any responsibility for his actions, contributed in large part
to his suspension from practice.
As Abel notes, once lawyers are found to have engaged in wrongdoing, they
are expected to engage in a degradation ceremony by expressing remorse during
the penalty phase of disciplinary proceedings.246 At this point, the disciplinary
system expects and rewards unambiguous displays of contrition. 247 Abel
observes, however, that the disciplinary process "is profoundly unconducive to
repentance." 248 This is because the penalty phase follows the guilt phase-
sometimes immediately.249 Attorneys are expected to lay aside their well-
developed adversarial instincts at this point.250 Some of Abel's lawyers-who
genuinely believed themselves to be good lawyers and good people-could not
express remorse. Their need to preserve self-esteem and their sense of unfairness
prevented them from participating in a degradation ceremony, resulting in more
serious sanctions.
IV. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
What lessons can be drawn from Lawyers in the Dock? As Abel reports, no
single profile emerges of the deviant lawyer. Nevertheless, a few important
lessons can be drawn from his stories. First-and least surprising-the case
studies tend to reconfirm that attorneys in practice can have a significant impact
on the ethical behavior of other lawyers. Attorneys transmit norms and in some
cases, directly contribute to deviant behavior. A second lesson concerns the role
that psychological processes can play in leading lawyers into deviant behavior.
This can be seen in the case of lawyers who neglect client matters, overoptimisti-
cally believing that they can meet their professional commitments, notwithstand-
245. Id. at 299-300, 322-26.
246. Id. at 31-36, 359.
247. This view is reflected in the disciplinary decisions and in ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, which makes "refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct" an aggravating factor and
remorse and "timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct" mitigating
factors in the decision to impose discipline sanctions. ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANcIoNs
9.22 (g); 9.32 (d), (1) (1991).
248. As Abel notes, lawyers are "trained to be fighters and are rewarded for their ferocity and intransigence."
ABEL, supra note 10, at 507. It is therefore not surprising that some have difficulty letting go of this training
when they find themselves in disciplinary proceedings.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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ing the evidence to the contrary. The role of psychological processes can also be
seen in the behavior of the experienced lawyer who confronts a novel question in
practice. Once the lawyers publicly commit to a course of conduct, psychological
processes explain why they do not deviate from it. A third lesson provided by
Abel's work concerns the ways in which the discipline process causes some
lawyers to cling fiercely to the belief that they have done nothing wrong, even in
the face of contrary evidence. Abel's description of lawyers inhabiting an
"alternative reality" begins to capture what occurs.25' This behavior can be both
bizarre and profoundly self-destructive.
A final lesson that can be derived from Lawyers in the Dock is that the impact
of lawyers' situations and psychological processes have been insufficiently
incorporated into our efforts to address lawyer misconduct. Lawyer regulation in
the U.S. relies heavily on a combination of education about the ethical rules and
discipline or civil liability. Abel's lawyers did not land in discipline proceedings
because of ignorance of the relevant ethical rules. Muto knew that he was not
supposed to neglect matters. Kreitzer knew that he was was not permitted to
engage ihi a ten percenter scheme. Furtzaig knew he was not supposed to lie to his
clients or the court. Additional education about the ethical rules would have been
unlikely to change their self-interested conduct. Likewise, the threat of discipline
seems to have little deterrent effect on some lawyers. Kreitzer and Muto had
previously been disciplined on more than one occasion. Byler was warned that he
was playing "Russian Roulette" with his legal career,252 but he could not change
course because psychological biases prevented him from acknowledging-even
to himself-that he had done anything wrong.
In light of these lessons, I agree with Abel that some of the approaches
currently taken to regulate lawyer conduct miss the mark.2 53 Tinkering with the
language of bar rules and mandatory CLE (in its current form) are unlikely to
have much impact on individual lawyers who frequently encounter situations that
put their own interests at odds with the interests of their clients. This is especially
true because many lawyers do not recognize that they are making ethical
decisions and even when they do recognize such decisions, they fail to consult the
ethical rules.254 Abel is also pessimistic about the impact of education and lawyer
sanctions, and while I am less pessimistic, 25 1 agree that they have not been very
effective in their current form. It is clear that in order to better protect the public
251. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 153.
253. AaEL, supra note 10, at 492, 513, 528.
254. Levin, supra note 48, at 359, 368-69.
255. ABEL, supra note 10, at 512. For the reasons described below, I think that education may help moderate
some of the psychological biases that can lead to misconduct. I also think that in some cases, greater willingness
to impose incapacitating sanctions (i.e., suspension and disbarment) may be the only way to protect the public
from lawyers who are recidivists and cannot be taught to stop repeating their mistakes.
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from lawyer misconduct, some changes in approach are needed. Some of Abel's
suggestions, plus a few of my own, are discussed below.
A. TRAINING AND INDIVIDUAL DEBIASING
The psychological biases that contributed to the situations in which Abel's
lawyers found themselves cannot be avoided simply by telling lawyers about
their biases. Individuals fail to accurately estimate the influence of cognitive
biases on their own decisionmaking or to develop defenses against them. 25 6
Moreover, people "overestimate the extent to which they can control their
judgment and feelings. '257 Egocentrism is unconscious and even when individu-
als are told about the bias in experimental settings, the information does not affect
how they assess decisions that would benefit them.258
Attempts to teach individuals how to overcome their biases have yielded
mixed results. When assessing their own biases, people tend to overvalue their
introspections (which are often inaccurate) as compared to their behavior.259
They also tend to think they are less susceptible to bias than their peers.26° In one
study, however, when participants learned that introspective information is
generally a poor source of information about influences on human judgment and
action, they no longer showed a tendency to deny their relative susceptibility to
bias. 261 Training about the processes underlying the perseverance of false beliefs
also has been shown to eliminate the effect of those beliefs in some situations.262
But whether training actually improves judgment in natural settings is unclear.263
There is no well-established protocol for debiasing human judgments. Psy-
chologists suggest that in order to overcome biases, an individual must have
awareness of the bias, the motivation to correct it, and some "awareness of the
direction and magnitude of the bias.",264 An individual's knowledge that he or she
will be held accountable for a decision may increase motivation to overcome
bias.265 In addition, individuals need a program of training with personalized
256. TYLER & BLADER, supra note 233, at 67; Bernard Fischoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UN-
CERTAINTY: HEuRISTics AND BIASES 428, 430-32 (Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Loewenstein, supra note 96, at
216.
257. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 170, at 126.
258. Loewenstein, supra note 96, at 224.
259. See Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection
illusion as a source of the bias blind spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 575-76(2006).
260. Id. at 575-76.
261. Id. at 576.
262. Ross et al., supra note 137, at 886-87.
263. Baruch Fischoff, Heuristics and Biases in Application, in HEURIsTics AND BIASEs: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTurrrvE JuDGMENT, supra note 84, at 747.
264. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 170, at 130. The latter is required because individuals tend to overcorrect
or undercorrect for their biases when they are unaware of how much they are biased and therefore how much
they need to calibrate their responses. Id. at 131-32.
265. Tetlock, supra note 213, at 592.
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feedback on their performance in order to improve judgment.266 It appears, more-
over, that different biases may require somewhat different debiasing tech-
niques.26 7
Bazerman suggests that in order to debias decisionmakers, it is necessary first
to '.unfreeze" their decision processes and then change them. This requires de-
scribing the specific judgmental deficiencies, explaining the root of these
deficiencies, and providing reassurance that the deficiencies should not be viewed
as a threat to self-esteem.268 Once unfreezing occurs, decisionmakers need to
learn to take an "outsider's view" on decisionmaking rather than the "insider's"
view. 269 For example, the "outsider" view sees that a project will take longer than
the insider estimates because the outsider looks at the situation and past behavior.
The outsider is also less optimistic. 2
70
Hansonand Benforado note that recommendations that people "step back" or
look at the "other side" may have limited effect, because cognitive biases may
cause them to think they have been open to other information, even when they
have not.27 ' And they may be correct. Lawyers are trained in law school to look at
all sides of a problem and to anticipate the arguments and priorities of the
opposing side. When the problem relates to their own interests and their own
conduct, however, Abel's case studies suggest that their training often deserts
them.
Another way to address this problem may be to literally incorporate an outsider
into the decisionmaking process. While people are not good at questioning their
own judgments, others may be able to do this for them in "moral conversa-
tion."272 One way to counteract biased thinking by lawyers may be to encourage
them to have conversations with others about ethical issues. Many solo and small
firm lawyers already rely on informal advice networks to answer their questions
in practice.273 If lawyers are trained to reach out to relatively disinterested
members of their networks-or others-when they confront ethical issues, this
266. Fischoff, supra note 256, at 437; but see Katherine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision Making Be
Improved, HBS Working Paper 08-102, available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-102.pdf (last visited
May 28, 2009).
267. For example, the confirmation bias may be overcome by asking questions in a way that encourages
consideration of disconfirming evidence. PLous, supra note 87, at 239. Debiasing for overconfidence may
require receiving feedback on a large sample of responses and being told about one's own performance.
Fischoff, supra note 256, at 437.
268. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 86, at 189-90.
269. Id. at 191, 193-95; Milkman et al., supra note 266, at 5-6. A similar view has been voiced by Thomas
Gilovich, who suggests that compensatory mental habits like the habit of thinking more broadly may help
combat certain biases. THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNow WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON
IN EVERYDAY LIFE 186 (1991).
270. BAZERMAN & MOORE, supra note 86, at 194.
271. Benforado & Hanson, supra note 33, at 335-36.
272. Regan, supra note 43, at 959. "
273. Sara Parikh, Professionalism and Its Discontents: A Study of Social Networks in the Plaintiffs' Personal
Injury Bar (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois) (on file with author); Leslie C. Levin,
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may help debias their thinking and improve their decisionmaking. 274 It is im-
portant, however, that the other lawyer not already be engaged in similar
behavior.275
One way to encourage this conduct is to incorporate lessons from social and
cognitive psychology into legal training.27 6 Learning about psychological biases
is important not just because it may improve lawyers' own decisionmaking, but
because it may help lawyers better understand and counsel their clients. At a
minimum, law students should be instructed about the most common biases that
present problems for lawyers and the human tendency to believe (incorrectly)
that these biases are easily controllable. For example, law students should learn
about egocentrism and the confirmation bias. They should be taught about how
the biases of overoptimism and overconfidence can lead lawyers astray in a
variety of contexts. Law students should also learn about the importance of
looking at external information-including their own past performance-when
making predictions about the future. In addition, since debiasing is difficult for an
individual who is cognitively taxed,2 77 students also should be taught that they
need adequate time and opportunity to consider the impact of their work
environment and situation on their decisions. Students should be further in-
structed to reach out for advice before they make a decision, and to seek advice
from lawyers who have no interest in the outcome of their decisions, rather than
from those who are likely to agree with them out of self-interest.
There are opportunities in law school for this type of training. Readings about
psychological biases can be introduced during orientation and can be illustrated
through simulations that elicit the biases in the students. Lessons about the
problems posed by these biases can be revisited in law school professional re-
sponsibility courses where the facts of cases can be examined for the purpose of
identifying the lawyers' psychological biases at work. In these courses, the
benefits of ethical conversations with "outsiders" also can be modeled through
class discussions of difficult ethical issues.278 Clinical law teaching also provides
teaching moments when the benefits of obtaining disinterested advice from the
Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Development of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 70
FoRDHAm L. REV. 847, 871-78 (2001).
274. Of course, lawyers will only reach out if they recognize that they are facing an ethical issue. Abel's
book, as well as psychological research, suggests that this is more likely to occur when a novel question is raised
than in other situations.
275. I am grateful to Rick Abel for this observation.
276. See Samuels & Casebeer, supra note 33, at 73-87.
277. See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert et al., On Cognitive Busyness: When Person Perceivers Meet Persons
Perceived, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 733 (1988); Benforado & Hanson, supra note 33, at 333, 343.
278. One way to do this is to describe a problem that raises ethical issues, ask students to "vote" with respect
to how a matter should be resolved, encourage class discussion of their views, and then take a revote. This
exercise can illustrate how moral conversation can improve ethical decisionmaking. The Armani and Belge
("buried bodies") case is a good vehicle for this exercise because it elicits moral intuitions that are sometimes
significantly affected by ethical conversation.
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larger group may help shape better (and less biased) decisions by student teams
who are representing a particular client. The clinics also provide good opportuni-
ties to discuss the impact of psychological biases on a whole range of lawyer and
client decisionmaking. Debiasing training through simulations could also be
offered in the same setting.2 79 Similar lessons can be carried over into bridge-
the-gap training and could also be incorporated in mandatory ethics CLE,
although they are unlikely to have the desired impact unless debiasing techniques
are taught experientially.
280
Bar associations could also provide some assistance with these efforts. Local
and specialty bar associations-which often enjoy credibility with many solo and
small firm lawyers28 -'-could provide hotlines for lawyers to call when they have
ethical questions. Some bar associations already provide this service but they
should be better advertised and expanded to provide faster and more reliable
responses.282 Discipline agencies could also encourage lawyers to reach out to
"outsiders" when they have ethical issues. They could do so by publishing a
policy which states that if a lawyer contacts a bar association ethics hotline for
advice, fully discloses the relevant facts, and follows that advice, it will be treated
as a significant mitigating factor in any subsequent discipline proceeding.283
One other idea that deserves consideration is to focus more on training lawyers
with respect to law office management skills.284 Early training is especially
279. It seems clear that debiasing training must occur in the context of individual or small-group simulations
or real world experiences rather than in lectures. One difficulty of educating students about bias is that it is
essential to expose their own biased thinking, which can be uncomfortable under the best of circumstances and
especially when it occurs in the presence of other classmates.
280. See, e.g., Fischoff, supra note 256, at 437 (describing some of necessary conditions for debiasing
training); see also supra notes 256, 258 and accompanying text.
281. Leslie C. Levin, Lawyers in Cyberspace: The Impact of Legal Listservs on the Professional
Development and Ethical Decisionmaking of Lawyers, 37 Aiz. ST. L.J. 589, 599, 614-15 (2005); Levin, supra
note 49, at 430.
282. In Manhattan, the New York City Bar (formerly the Association of the Bar of the City of New York)
maintains such a hotline but many solo and small firm lawyers do not belong to that organization and would not
think to contact that bar association if they had a question. The New York County Lawyers' Association also has
an ethics hotline, but it is not well-advertised.
283. Recently a California court rejected a lawyer's claim that she should not be sanctioned because she had
contacted an ethics hotline for advice, but in that case it was unclear whether the lawyer had provided all
relevant information to the hotline attorney during the call. Wallis v. PHLAssocs., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 303-04
(Cal Ct. App. 2008). One way to create a permanent record and avoid the problem presented in Wallis would be
to require that the lawyer lay out the facts upon which the advice is sought in an email.
284. Abel argues that lawyers would benefit from being trained like surgical residents. He is no doubt
correct. During their medical training, surgeons are socialized to report errors quickly, take responsibility for
them and learn from mistakes. ABEL, supra note 10, at 510-11. The legal profession's closest analog to the
hospital setting is law school legal clinics, which are not adequately funded to provide all bar applicants with
sufficient training. The next closest institutional training experience can be found in large law firms.
Unfortunately, unlike surgeons, solo and small firm lawyers-who receive the most discipline-do not remain
in an institutional setting with clearly defined routines and expectations once they enter practice. The challenge
for many of these lawyers is that they are essentially working-and learning the norms of practice-on their
own.
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important because the early lessons can stay with lawyers long after they are first
absorbed. Muto, who did not even know about office diaries, is an example of a
lawyer who might have benefited from law office management training. All
lawyers who go into solo or small firm practice-regardless of their years of
practice-should be required to attend bridge-the-gap programs or CLE with a
law office management component that would instruct them about how to re-
sponsibly manage their staffs, their phone calls, and their caseloads. This training
will not debias lawyer thinking, but it could educate lawyers about measures that
may help them avoid future discipline.
B. CHANGES IN THE LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEM
Abel's case studies also suggest that changes in the discipline system should
be considered to reduce the tendency of the discipline process to trigger
self-destructive behavior that is costly to the system and to the lawyers them-
selves. For example, local and specialty bar associations could provide volun-
teers who are familiar with the discipline process to meet with lawyers who
receive discipline complaints in order to help the lawyers understand the culture
of the disciplinary authority and decide how best to proceed.285 These volunteers
could provide an "outsider's" perspective that might help lawyers view their own
conduct in a more objective light. This type of free assistance is provided by the
Queensland Law Society to solicitors who receive discipline complaints.286
While some lawyers may be reluctant to contact the bar association because they
do not want to share complaint information with a peer, the experience in
Qieensland-where about one-third of the solicitors who receive complaints
consult with the volunteers -- suggests that lawyers will avail themselves of the
opportunity. 287 This type of service is especially important for solo and small firm
practitioners, who often cannot afford their own counsel but may need help
overcoming counterproductive behavior that can be triggered by psychological
processes.
Another way to reduce some of lawyers' self-justifying behaviors might be to
directly address the perception that the discipline system is inherently unfair in its
treatment of solo and small firm lawyers. The secrecy of New York's discipline
process undoubtedly contributes to this view. Unlike many jurisdictions, New
285. My review of discipline files in another jurisdiction revealed that many lawyers do not under-
stand the importance of prompt responses to inquiries from discipline counsel. In many cases, discipline
complaints would not have proceeded to a hearing if the lawyer had simply responded to the initial inquiry from
bar counsel.
286. Email from John Briton, Queensland Legal Services Commissioner to Leslie Levin (Dec. 21, 2008). Up
to three free hours of advice is provided. Id.
287. Id.
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York's DDC publishes no public report of its activities,288 and it is impossible
even to determine how many complaints against solo and small firm lawyers are
received and how many are disciplined. Moreover, the composition of the DDC
may contribute to the sense of unfairness. More than sixty percent of the lawyers
who sit on the First Departmental Disciplinary Committee appear to be large firm
lawyers, 289 even though such lawyers rarely appear before the DDC and com-
prise only about twenty percent of all practicing lawyers.29° In Muto's and
Byler's cases, two of the three lawyers on the hearing panels were large firm
291lawyers, which may have contributed to their view that the process was biased
against them.
C. OTHER REGULATORY CHANGES
In light of the uncertainty about effective debiasing techniques-and the fact
that some lawyers will not want to change their self-interested decisionmaking
-it is also important to identify other measures that will protect the public from
lawyer misconduct. In Lawyers in the Dock, Abel offers several suggestions for
changes that will increase public protection, starting with mandatory malpractice
insurance. He believes it is "unconscionable" that legal malpractice insurance is
not required in the United States in order to practice law.292 I agree with his
assessment. While Australia, Canada, and the United Kindom have long required
lawyers to carry malpractice insurance, bar resistance to mandatory insurance
continues unabated in the U.S. 2 9 3 Admittedly, mandatory malpractice insurance
offers incomplete protection. In some of Abel's cases-as is true in many dis-
cipline matters-the availability of malpractice insurance would have made no
288. Some data about the DDC's activities appear in an annual report published by the New York State Bar
Association, but that report provides very limited information. See COMM. ON PROF'L DISCIPLINE, N.Y. STATE
BAR Ass'N, ANNUAL REPORT ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN NEW YORK STATE FOR THE YEAR 2006.
289. This information, like much discipline-related information in the First Department, is not published, but
my review of DDC letterhead from July 2004 revealed that there were 24 large firm lawyers on the Committee
and 15 lawyers who worked in all other practice settings.
290. New York lawyers in firms of over 50 lawyers make up about 17% of all active New York lawyers.
CARSON, supra note 229, at 162-63. The concentration of large firms in Manhattan makes it likely that the
percentage of large firm lawyers is somewhat greater than 17% in the First Department.
291. In Muto's case, panel members included Bernard Lipshie, a partner at Stroock & Stroock & Lavan and
Justin Feldman, a partner at Kronish Lieb Wiener & Hellman. ABEL, supra note 10, at 169. In Byler's case,
hearing panel member Phillip Forlenza was a partner at Patterson, Belknap Webb & Tyler and Robert Haig was
a partner at Kelly, Drye & Warren. Id. at 316,318.
292. ABEL, supra note 10, at 513. As he notes, the sole exception is Oregon, which requires its lawyers to
purchase malpractice insurance. Id. at 63. A few other jurisdictions require lawyers to reveal whether they have
malpractice insurance, but this information is not always readily accessible to the public. Id.
293. See, e.g., Alan Cooper, VSB Sinks Mandatory Insurance, VA. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 27, 2008 (reporting that
Virginia Bar Council rejected mandatory malpractice insurance for lawyers). By way of contrast, malpractice
insurance must be carried by attorneys in other common law countries including Australia, Canada and the
United Kingdom. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 10, at 501; Legal Profession Act, 2003 (NSW, Austl.), sec. 403,
406; Legal Profession Act, R.S.B.C. secs. 23 (1) (c); 30.(7) (1998).
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difference to the victims. The clients often could not afford litigation, did not
wish to sue, or in one case, would have had no legal basis for doing so.
Nevertheless, malpractice insurers help lawyers improve their office systems and
practices in an effort to reduce claims experience.29 4 Moreover, in some cases,
malpractice recoveries would help to make clients whole.
Abel also sees benefits to requiring lawyers to work in multi-lawyer firms
rather than solo practices, because they "would have reputational interests in
preventing misconduct and a financial incentive in ensuring minimum qual-
ity.'' 29 5 He suggests that it is more likely that there would be standardized
practices (e.g., electronic calendaring systems) in multi-lawyer firms. He further
notes that discipline against law firm partners might create incentives within
organizations to improve behavior.2 96 Although I believe that solos should be
strongly encouraged to have a "back up" arrangement with another lawyer to
provide coverage in case of illness or incapacitation, 97 I question the value of
requiring lawyers to work in multi-lawyer firms. A growing number of solo
lawyers work from their homes, both to keep their overhead low and for quality
of life reasons. A requirement that they join multi-lawyer firms would either end
this practice or (more likely) result in firm affiliations in name only. Moreover,
there is little evidence that working in a multi-lawyer firm would avert most
unethical behavior. Kreitzer, Furtzaig and Byler were all affiliated with law firms.
Muto worked with travel agencies in a small firm even before he became a solo
lawyer. Many small firms operate essentially like a collection of solo lawyers,
with attorneys practicing in different areas, 9 8 making it unlikely that the partners
can cover each other's matters or that they are even aware of how the other firm
lawyers are conducting their practices. The prevalent use of LLP's also reduces
potential liability for a partner's misconduct. While making lawyers subject to
discipline for their partners' misconduct might create incentives to improve
systems within law firms, as a practical matter, the imposition of discipline for a
partner's misconduct is rare;2 99 it would need to increase dramatically before an
affiliation requirement could be expected to have any effect.
Finally, I agree with Abel that private discipline sanctions should be eliminated
and that more should be done to publicize lawyer discipline information.3 ° °
294. See, e.g., Attorney Liability Assurance Society, Loss Prevention, at http://www.alas.com/about-
lp.shtml (last visited May 28, 2009) (describing loss prevention materials available to insureds).
295. ABEL, supra note 10, at 525.
296. Id. at 518.
297. Levin, supra note 48, at 387-88.
298. Levin, supra note 273, at 867.
299. Only. New York and New Jersey provide for the imposition of discipline against a law firm. On
occasion, discipline has been imposed against a law firm or against a lawyer for another partner's wrongdoing
under ethical rules governing supervisory lawyers, but those decisions are exceedingly rare.
300. ABEL, supra note 10, at 509. As I have previously argued, even discipline complaints against lawyers
should be publicized once there has been a finding of probable cause. Levin, supra note 8, at 29-32, 49-50.
Permitting access to discipline complaints once probable cause is found may help to avoid situations-like
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Although some states have made significant progress in publicizing lawyer
discipline sanctions on websites, °1 many states lag far behind in that effort. In
New York, there is no website that contains information about the "public"
sanctions imposed on lawyers and lay people would be hard-pressed to determine
how to obtain this information.3 °2 I am less optimistic than Abel, however, that
publicity will serve as a deterrent to misconduct,3 °3 at least for lawyers like those
he describes in his case studies. Abel's lawyers often believed they were
behaving ethically, and they would have been unlikely to consider the possibility
that their conduct would result in a published discipline sanction. Even when they
were aware, like Kreitzer, that they were engaging in unethical conduct (in his
case, the ten percenter scheme), overconfidence and overoptimism led them to
believe they would not be caught. Instead, lawyer discipline information should
be publicized in ways that permit members of the public to easily access this
information so that they can better protect themselves when choosing their lawyers.
V. CONCLUSION
When gazing through this window into lawyer misconduct, the question
naturally arises: why do some lawyers engage in misconduct and others do not?
The case studies do not answer this question. Nor do the psychological processes
described in this essay. Many lawyers work in pressurized environments like the
one Furtzaig confronted, but they do not deal with them by neglecting cases,
forging documents, and lying to clients. Many lawyers manage their practices
(including high volume practices) without neglecting client matters as did Muto
and Kreitzer; other lawyers know about travel agencies and ten percenter
schemes, but they do not become involved with them. Many lawyers face
financial difficulties but do not, like Byler, take client funds to pay themselves
what they think is "fair." Why some-but not all-lawyers engage in misconduct
requires further study, and may never be fully understood. 3°
Nevertheless, Lawyers in the Dock takes us several steps closer to understand-
ing how some lawyers reason when representing their clients and how psychologi-
cal processes can distort their judgments. More work is needed in order to
Kreitzer's case-where new and existing clients have no way to learn about pending charges, and lawyers
continue to do harm until sanctions are imposed.
301. Id. at 20-21.
302. The New York Office of Court Administration website only reveals that a New York lawyer is currently
suspended, disbarred or delinquent in registering. In an effort to determine what would be required to obtain a
lawyer's discipline history, I called the First Departmental Discipline Committee and after waiting on hold for
about ten minutes, I was told to call the Character and Fitness Committee to inquire about a particular lawyer's
public discipline history. The man who answered seemed surprised by my request, but then provided me with
the information.
303. AaEL, supra note 10, at 523.
304. Notwithstanding efforts by criminologists, they have thus far been unable to explain why one individual
commits crimes when most others do not. See id. at 32, 492.
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understand these processes, both as they occur in solo and small firm lawyers and
in lawyers who work in larger organizations. Even though our understanding is
imperfect, it is not too soon to consider how to better protect the public. At a
minimum, more thought should be given to socializing all lawyers into ethical
practices through clinical and post-graduate training.3 °5 In addition, teaching
lawyers about the non-conscious processes that can cause them to make
erroneous decisions and act in self-serving ways is important so that they can
recognize this behavior in their colleagues even if they cannot always see how it
affects their own judgments. If it is possible to do so effectively, debiasing
techniques should be taught, not only to protect the public, but to improve all
types of predictions and decisions that lawyers make in practice. Training
lawyers to seek out the "outsider's" perspective when they are making decisions
can also improve their decisionmaking.
It is important to acknowledge, too, that even if debiasing can be ef-
fectively taught-and this is a big "if"-it is only a partial solution. As Abel
notes, most law students want (and need) to make money as lawyers 'and it can
be difficult to do so in solo and small firm practices.30 6 The clients of solo and
small firm practitioners are especially vulnerable to breaches of trust by their
lawyers; some self-interested decisionmaking by their lawyers will inevitably
occur. Mandatory malpractice insurance would provide some measure of
protection, but not for all clients or in all instances of wrongdoing. It is there-
fore critically important to teach the public how to find a good lawyer when a
legal problem arises in their lives. This requires alerting the public to the need
to check lawyers' histories before entering into retainer agreements. It also
means that information about lawyers' discipline histories must be made
easily accessible to the public in a form that can be readily understood. These
measures cannot avert all lawyer misconduct, but they will better protect the
public from the lawyers in the dock.
APPENDIX
David Kreitzer was a graduate of John Marshall School of Law and was
admitted to practice in 1974. He had one to four associates during the relevant
period and a personal injury practice with over 1000 cases. In 1993 and 1995, he
was charged with neglect of fourteen cases. The neglect spanned from 1981-
1995. He was later charged with failure to adequately supervise his associates and
was indicted for engaging in a ten percenter scheme, which involved payments to
a middleman to expedite resolution of thirteen different insurance claims. In 1999
he pled guilty to one count of second degree commercial bribery, a misdemeanor.
305. As noted, Abel believes that there is much to be learned from the medical profession in this regard. Id. at
509-14; see also supra note 284.
306. ABEL, supra note 10, at 492.
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At the disciplinary hearing, he blamed others for the neglect. The hearing panel
found neglect in nine matters and misrepresentation in one other matter. In
mitigation, Kreitzer presented evidence that he was treated for Hodgkin's disease
in 1976 and esophageal cancer in 1989-90. He previously had received four
admonitions. He was suspended for three years in 1997, but after the court
considered the misdemeanor conviction, he was disbarred in 2001.3°7
Joseph Muto was a graduate of the University of Bridgeport Law School. He
was admitted to practice in 1987 and began practicing immigration law in
Manhattan's Chinatown in 1997. He started working as a solo practitioner in
1998 and had 450-500 active matters. In 2001, he was charged with neglecting
numerous client matters, assisting the unauthorized practice of law by working
with travel agents, mismanaging his escrow account and failing to report his
address. Disciplinary counsel claimed that he did not have an office and that in
most cases he never met directly with clients because he had been retained by
travel agents. A flying phobia prevented him from appearing in some out-of-town
cases. Muto denied many of the allegations, blaming some of his clients, and
claiming that he provided high quality, low-cost representation. His mother had
been diagnosed with terminal cancer in September 1998, which he claimed pre-
vented him from appearing in some matters. His self-representation was char-
acterized by the Referee as displaying "general disorganization and a kind of
ad hoc scatterbrained approach" as well as "an air of delusion about it." Muto
previously had received an admonition for neglecting ten cases and had been
suspended from practice in 1994. In 2002, he was disbarred.3 °8
Lawrence Furtzaig was a graduate of New York Law School and was
admitted to the bar in 1986. He began working at a boutique real estate litigation
firm before law school and continued to work at the 30-lawyer firm- after
graduation. He became a non-equity partner in 1990 and an equity partner in
2000. He billed between 2200 to 2400 hours per year. In 1992, he failed to restore
two cases to the court's calendar and paid the client $60,000 to conceal what had
occurred. From 1992 through 2001, he was untruthful in another ten to fifteen
cases, at times forging documents and lying to clients to conceal his neglect. He
was charged with misconduct involving five clients and nine matters in 2002. He
admitted all the charges but claimed severe depression as a mitigating factor in
the disciplinary proceedings. He also noted his responsibility as the sole support
for his wife and young triplets and that he had no previous discipline. In 2003, he
was suspended for five years.30 9
307. Id. at 71-72, 76, 90-94.
308. Id. at 105-06, 160, 167, 172.
309. Id. at 193-95, 199-200, 202-03.
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Benjamin N. Cardozo and Deyan Brashich were graduates of NYU Law
School. Cardozo was admitted to practice in 1942 and Brashich was admitted in
1965. They were solo practitioners in separate practices, but worked together on a
Surrogate's Court matter. In the early 1990's, they convinced their client to accept
a settlement that favored them in the distribution of attorneys' fees over the
interests of their client. They also sought additional fees from the Surrogate's
Court, failing to disclose their fee arrangement with their client, which had
already resulted in a payment to them. They were charged in 1997 with dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice and personal conflict of interest. Cardozo, who was 84, had never
previously been disciplined. He received a public censure. Brashich had received
six prior admonitions for neglect. He submitted evidence of significant family
difficulties, including the serious illness of his daughter and his mother's in-
capacitating stroke. He received a public censure but was later suspended for one
year due to a subsequent complaint that arose out of his representation of another
client and related to the charging of an illegal or excessive fee.31°
Philip Byler, a graduate of Harvard Law School, was admitted to practice in
1977. He worked at a small firm during the relevant period. In 1992, he agreed to
help a friend with a tax shelter problem for which the IRS was claiming the client
owed $180,000. Although Byler initially (and orally) agreed to do the work for a
maximum of $20,000, he later claimed that his client had told him that if there
was a tax refund, he could keep it. When an unexpectedly large refund was
received in 1994, Byler transferred the money to his own account and then told
the client. The client disputed Byler's right to do so but Byler refused to escrow
the funds. There was evidence that Byler was having financial difficulties at the
time. His client complained to the Disciplinary Committee and Byler was offered
a private admonition, which he rejected. He was then charged with failing to
maintain intact a client's funds and failing to pay funds due to a client. His
defense in the disciplinary proceedings was marked by voluminous filings, the
continual insistence that he had acted correctly, and attacks on his client. The
panel found that "the evidence surrounding the critical factual disputes is
inconclusive" but that Byler had an obligation to escrow the disputed refund.
Byler had never previously been disciplined but the panel found that Byler's
"self-righteous position.., so out of touch with reality" was an aggravating
factor. In 2000, he was suspended for a year.
Arthur Wisehart was a University of Michigan Law School graduate and was
admitted to the bar in 1955. He was a solo practitioner during the relevant period.
310. Id. at 259, 264, 266-70, 274, 279.
311. Id. at 289-90, 314-16, 322, 333-34.
2009] 1593
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETIcs
In 1991 his client removed opposing counsel's privileged documents from a con-
ference table during a deposition in a sexual harassment litigation. Wisehart read
the documents, used them to attempt to extract a settlement and when the court
dismissed the sexual harassment case, Wisehart made a series of offensive
charges against the presiding judge and others in an effort to get them to recuse
themselves. In 1996, he was charged, inter alia, with dishonesty, conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice, disregarding a tribunal ruling, undignified or
discourteous conduct degrading to a tribunal and knowingly making false
accusations relating to a judge. He claimed in the disciplinary proceedings that he
had acted appropriately and in his submissions, he attacked opposing counsel,
judges and members of the hearing panel. He had never before been disciplined.
312In 2001, at the age of 72, he was suspended from practice for two years.
312. Id. at 448-49, 456, 476-77.
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